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LEGALITY AND EMPATHY 
Lynne N. Henderson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the Constitution 
requires. But it is disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to 
be premised upon unfounded assumptions about how people live. 
- Justice Thurgood Marsha111 
In 1976, John Noonan's Persons and Masks of the Law 2 appeared. 
In the first chapter, Noonan alluded to the unhinging of the law from 
human experience as well as the relationship of love to power and 
emotion to law. He conceded the need for the Rule of Law for social 
control - the alternative apparently being the war of all against all -
but be also sought wistfully to incorporate human beings into legal 
thinking, stating, "Abandonment of the rules produces monsters; so 
does neglect of persons."3 Yet Noonan, like others troubled by the 
lack of humane responses in the law, could do no more than raise a cry 
against legality's denial of persons. He never developed a coherent 
approach to help us avoid the tendency of legality to abstract the 
problems of persons to the point of denying persons altogether. 4 
The troubling phenomenon produced by fidelity to the Rule of 
Law in legal theory and practice is captured in the quotation of Justice 
Marshall's dissent in Kras: Legal decisions and lawmaking frequently 
have nothing to do with understanding human experiences, affect, suf-
* Assistant Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. B.A. 1975, J.D. 1979, Stanford 
University. - Ed. 
Robin L. West and Paul Brest provided me with support, encouragement, criticism, and 
nudging throughout this project. My colleagues Jim Wilson and Mickey Davis were very helpful 
and conscientious readers of various drafts. I owe thanks to Robert Weisberg and Mark Tushnet 
for some special assistance and to Joyce Sterling, Bill Simon, and Deborah Rhode for their help 
and interest. Mistakes that remain are mine. 
1. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460 (1973) (dissenting opinion). 
2. J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976). 
3. Id. at 18. 
4. Instead, the book is both an argument for historical investigation of law and a collection of 
essays on particular cases or legal issues, primarily from the point of view of legal 
decisionmakers. There are allusions to tensions produced and stabs at psychohistory. See, e.g .. 
id. at 111-51 (discussing the Palsgraf case). But the book contains no coherent alternative to 
"rule boundedness." Judge Noonan's main scholarly concern has been abortion, however, and 
he has shifted his attention to other matters as well. He has indicated that he has not developed 
any subsequent theories of judicial interpretation based on the suggestions in Persons and Masks 
of the Law (Comments of Judge Noonan during faculty seminar, Cleveland-Marshall College of 
Law, Apr. 1, 1987). 
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fering - how people do live. 5 And feeling is denied recognition and 
legitimacy under the guise of the "rationality" of the Rule of Law. 
Incorporating experiential understanding of persons or groups into an 
ideological system based on a reductionist concept of reason, a system 
that at times seems to have a fetish for predictability and control under 
the Rule of Law, raises terrifying specters of destabilization, chaos, 
and anarchy. Accordingly, the emotional, physical, and experiential 
aspects of being human have by and large been banished from the bet-
ter legal neighborhoods and from explicit recognition in legal dis-
course (although they sometimes get smuggled in as "facts" in briefs 
and opinions). Ironically, while emotion may generate laws via "poli-
tics," once those laws meet whatever criteria are necessary to consti-
tute legitimacy in a system, they are cleansed of emotion under this 
vision of the Rule of Law. 6 The law becomes not m~rely a human 
institution affecting real people, but rather The Law. 
A scholar or a judge may react to the pain and anguish caused 
actual human beings by a given law or doctrine, but she will seldom 
point to the painful or existential consequences of that law as reason to 
change it. This is because the ideological structures of legal discourse 
and cognition block affective and phenomenological argument: The 
"normal" discourse of law disallows the language of emotion and ex-
perience. 7 The avoidance of emotion, affect, and experiential under-
standing reflects an impoverished view of reason and understanding -
one that focuses on cognition in its most reductionist sense. This im-
poverished view stems from a belief that reason and emotion are sepa-
5. Kras involved a challenge to the $50 filing fee required to institute bankruptcy proceed-
ings. The majority decision distinguished Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), which had 
held that due process required waiver of court fees for indigents seeking dissolution of marriage, 
on the grounds that the interests in the marital relationship and association were "fundamental" 
under the Constitution. Bankruptcy, the Kras majority said, involved no such fundamental in-
terest. 409 U.S. at 443 (1973). The majority also denied any equal protection problems, given 
the absence of a fundamental right to declare bankruptcy. Three dissenters focused on a right of 
access to the courts to litigate issues raised by government-imposed obligations. See 409 U.S. at 
451-57 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall went farther, denying a public/private law dis-
tinction in the right to access. 409 U.S. at 462-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall observed: 
It may be easy for some people to think that weekly savings of less than $2 are no burden. 
But no one who has had close contact with poor people can fail to understand how close to the 
margin of survival many of them are .... A pack or two of cigarettes may be, for them, not a 
routine purchase but a luxury .... The desperately poor almost never go to see a movie, 
which the majority seems to believe is an almost weekly activity. They have more important 
things to do with what little money they have .... 
409 U.S. at 460 (emphasis added). 
6. R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 2, 9 (1986). 
7. The distinction between "normal" discourse (the accepted method of thinking and speak-
ing) and "abnormal" discourse (departures from the conventions of a particular discipline's con-
versational practices) is Richard Rorty's. See R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF 
NATURE 320 (1979) ("Abnormal discourse is what happens when someone joins in the discourse 
who is ignorant of these conventions or who sets them aside."). 
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rate, that reason can and must restrain emotion, that law-as-reason 
can and must order, rationalize, and control. 8 
As a result, an entire mode of understanding and interpreting is 
seemingly foreclosed by legal discourse - or, more likely, it rumbles 
underground, much like the Freudian unconscious, seldom explicitly 
breaking through. That mode of understanding is best captured by the 
word "empathy," a word that at first seems counterintuitive in a world 
defined as legal. Yet empathy is a form of understanding, a phenome-
non that encompasses affect as well as cognition in determining mean-
ings;9 it is a rich source of knowledge and approaches to legal 
problems - which are, ultimately, human problems. Properly under-
stood, empathy is not a "weird" or "mystical" phenomenon, nor is it 
"intuition." Rather, it is a way of knowing that can explode received 
knowledge of legal problems and structures, that reveals moral 
problems previously sublimated by pretensions to reductionist ration-
ality, and that provides a bridge to normatively better legal outcomes. 
While there exists a tendency on the part of lawyers, judges, and -
might I add - law professors, to deny a role to empathic responses in 
their approaches to legal problems, it is no hunch to claim that the 
better understanding we have of a situation at all levels, the better our 
decisionmaking is likely to be. To have total historical, empirical, 
emotional, experiential, and contextual understanding of a given legal 
problem before making a decision is an unreachable ideal. But empa-
thy enables the decisionmaker to have an appreciation of the human 
meanings of a given legal situation. Empathy aids both processes of 
discovery - the procedure by which a judge or other legal 
decisionmaker reaches a conclusion - and processes of justification -
the procedure used by a judge or other decisionmaker to justify the 
conclusion - in a way that disembodied reason simply cannot. 10 
This article rejects the assumption that legality - by which I mean 
the dominant belief system about the Rule and role of Law - and 
empathy are mutually exclusive concepts. Failure to recognize the 
phenomenon of empathy explicitly in legal decisions more generally 
may result from a fear of the emotional realm as irrational, rather than 
a rational. It may stem from a belief that the divide between "subject" 
and "object" is uncrossable. 11 The resistance to empathy may be at-
8. See notes 72-99 infra and accompanying text. 
9. See notes 26-38 infra and accompanying text. 
10. R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 27 (1961). 
11. Or frightening. For one discussion of the "subjective/objective" dichotomy, see R. 
RoRTY, supra note 7, at 335-42. For an example of the posited fear of intimate connection with 
others, see R. UNGER, PASSION: AN EssAY ON PERSONALITY (1984), especially at 220-39. Cf. 
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tributable to the adversarial ideology acquired during law school 12 -
understanding the adversary is not important unless it serves one's in-
strumental purpose - or to the fact that little in the professional cul-
ture and scholarship encourages development and use of empathic 
skills. 13 But empathy can contribute to meaning and interpretation 
and enlarge the universe of legal discourse and understanding. The 
stories or narratives of the law can be heard differently, and more 
meanings will be available to legal discourse through explicit attempts 
to understand the situation and experience of others. This can lead to 
revolutions in habitual legal thinking and transformation of legal 
problems. 
This article argues that an understanding of the phenomenon of 
empathic knowledge has enormous explanatory power. It does so by 
examining from the perspective of empathy the stories of the Supreme 
Court's decisions in Brown v. Board of Education (I}, 14 Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 15 Roe v. Wade, 16 and Bowers v. Hardwick 17 The article 
argues that Brown I can best be explained by empathy, that Shapiro 
again manifests the breakthrough of empathic understanding, and that 
Roe v. Wade and its progeny demonstrate the Court's failure to hear 
certain empathic narratives. Finally, the article examines the recent 
case of Bowers v. Hardwick as an example of the complete failure of 
empathy in a legal decision. is 
Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 291, 338-44 
(1985) (discussing R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmCS (1975)). 
12. But see Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the 
Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 1359, 1387-404 (arguing 
that formal procedures of adversary model may better counteract prejudice and lack of empathy 
than "alternative dispute resolution" models). 
13. There has been some recognition of this, but it has largely fallen upon deaf, if not hostile, 
ears. Compare E. DVORKIN, E. HIMMELSTEIN & H. LESNICK, BECOMING A LAWYER: A Hu-
MANISflC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM (1981) (book seeking 
ways to "humanize" professional legal education), with Gellhorn, ''Humanistic Perspective": A 
Critique, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 99 (1982) (accusing authors of trying to "de-intellectualize" legal 
education). The "humanistic" approach does not specifically mention empathy. Two professors 
who perhaps tried to examine issues of personal and professional development having to do with 
empathy in a seminar entitled "Human Aspects of Legal Education" found that the results were 
mixed; from one professor's report of the outcome and from a discussion of the class with some 
participants, it does not appear that members of the group developed any particular empathy for 
one another. See Weinstein, The Integration of Intellect and Feeling in the Study of Law, 32 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 87 (1982). See also Barkai & Fine, Empathy Training for Lawyers and Law Stu-
dents, 13 Sw. U. L. REV. 505 (1983) (concentrating primarily on the affective component of 
empathy). 
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
15. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
17. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). 
18. I chose these cases because they are familiar to the legal community and they appear to 
illustrate the role of empathy - or Jack of it - particularly well, because they involved people 
1578 Michigan Law Review 
II. LEGALITY, EMPATHY, AND MORAL CHOICE 
A. What Empathy Means 
[Vol. 85:1574 
Empathy has become a favorite word in critical and feminist schol-
arship. Unfortunately, it is never defined or described - it is seem-
ingly tossed in as a "nice" word in opposition to something bad or 
undesirable. 19 Because I argue that empathy is a phenomenon that 
exists to expand understanding of others, I may or may not be writing 
in the traditions characterized as "critical" or "feminist." But I share 
the concerns of these traditions about the lack of humanistic response 
in legal thinking and have drawn on them to shape my own thinking. 
Duncan Kennedy's article, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in 
Contract and Tort Law, 20 suggests some of the ideas developed here. 
He states that "the basis of paternalism is empathy or love,"21 but he 
fails to define empathy. It appears that he substitutes the words "intu-
ition" and "intuitive" to describe what in fact are empathic phenom-
ena,22 but he makes several mistakes while correctly arguing that this 
"intuitive" form of knowledge is a form of "real knowledge."23 First, 
he seems to assume that empathic understanding necessarily leads to 
intervention, "paternalist action," or altruistic behavior.24 Second, he 
alludes to intuitive understanding/empathy as a form of "unity" with 
the Other,25 but it is not clear if he is alluding to the collapse of ego 
boundaries, which is not a necessary consequence of empathy, or sim-
ply fellow-feeling. Finally, he leaves tantalizingly unanswered the 
question of how empathic knowledge, particularly knowledge of peo-
ple who are not intimate associates, can occur. 
whose experiences and situations were different from, or outside of, mainstream American cul-
tural understandings. 
19. See note 26 infra. Other scholars have also referred to empathy without defining or 
explaining it. John Hart Ely refers to empathy almost as a "given" in his discussion of criteria 
for suspect classifications. See J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 160-61 (1980). Robert 
Burt defines empathy as a "benign, altruistic view" of relations. Burt, Constitutional Law and the 
Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 491 (1984). John Denvir has recently written that 
racism prevents "the empathetic response essential to social harmony .... " Denvir, William 
Shakespeare and the Jurisprudence of Comedy, 39 STAN. L. REV. 825, 844 (1987). 
20. Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special 
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982). 
21. Id. at 563. According to Kennedy the basis of paternalism is "intersubjectivity,'' the 
scope of which is "limited by our capacity for empathy." Id. at 624. 
22. In describing "strong paternalism,'' for example, Kennedy writes: "The actor feels he 
has intuitive access to the other's feelings and perceptions about the world, and that he partici-
pates directly in the suffering and happiness of the other." Id. at 638 (emphasis added). This 
"condition of unity" can lead to sensing "false consciousness" as an "intuition of error." Id. 
23. Id. at 639. 
24. Id. at 625, 638-49. 
25. Id. at 638, 647. 
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Thus it is necessary to develop an explanation of what I mean by 
"empathy." While the word often appears to be used interchangeably 
with "love," "altruism," and "sympathy,"26 it actually encompasses 
specific psychological phenomena. Although the literature of empathy 
manifests disagreement about what is or is not "empathy," rather than 
projection, sympathy, or what have you, there are three basic phenom-
ena captured by the word: (1) feeling the emotion of another; (2) un-
derstanding the experience or situation of another, both affectively and 
cognitively, often achieved by imagining oneself to be in the position of 
the other; and (3) action brought about by experiencing the distress of 
another (hence the confusion of empathy with sympathy and compas-
sion). The first two forms are ways of knowing, the third form a cata-
lyst for action. 
Some of the confusion about the meaning of empathy may result 
from its origins and comparatively recent entry into the language. 
"Empathy" came into English as a translation of the German word 
Einfiihlung, a word describing aesthetic perceptions.27 Translations of 
Einfiihlung sometimes used the word "sympathy," however, and the 
confusion of meanings of "sympathy" and "empathy" - which per-
haps could be said better to capture a specific type of sympathy that 
involves being flooded with emotion - has persisted. (Thus, some 
twentieth-century philosophers have scoffed at "empathy," while at 
the same time describing empathic phenomena as important to human 
understanding). 28 
As originally coined, empathy simply meant a physical reaction to 
something: e.g., people observing the leaning tower of Pisa tend to 
26. See id. at 563; Cornell, supra note 11, at 340-44; West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic 
Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud's Theory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 817, 859-
64 (1986); Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace 
Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1178 & n.239 (1986). 
27. Reed, The Antithetical Meaning of the Term "Empathy" in Psychoanalytic Discourse, in 
EMPATHY I 7 (J. Lichtenberg, M. Bornstein & D. Silver eds. 1984); Agosta, Empathy and Inter-
subjectivity, in EMPATHY I, supra, at 43, 44. 
28. Martin Buber, who perhaps more than any midtwentieth-century philosopher was con-
cerned with describing empathic understanding, see M. BUBER, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN 1-39 
(1965), declined to employ the "not very significant term 'empathy,'" which for Buber meant 
"the exclusion of one's own concreteness, the extinguishing of the actual situation of life, the 
absorption in pure aestheticism of the reality in which one participates." Id. at 97 (emphasis 
added). Yet Buber's use of "inclusion" or "dialogical relation" captures the understanding, af-
fectively and cognitively, of the Other embodied in the psychotherapeutic definition of empathy: 
It is the extension of one's own concreteness, the fulfillment of the actual situation of life, the 
complete presence of the reality in which one participates. Its elements are first, a relation, 
of no matter what kind, between two persons, second, an event experienced by them in 
common, ... and, third, the fact that this one person, without forfeiting anything of the felt 
reality of his activity, at the same time lives through the common event from the standpoint 
of the other. 
Id. at 97. 
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lean with the building. It also meant grimacing when someone else hit 
her thumb with a hammer - feeling the physical sensation of pain. 
This meaning quickly expanded to include the empathic response to 
emotions. Empathy thus captured the concept of feeling globalized 
emotions from others - anger, fear, joy, love - or understanding the 
affect of a communication by "tuning in to the feelings of another." 
Globalized emotional reactions alert a person to the presence of emo-
tion in an interaction or in another; however, these reactions may be 
misinterpreted or the emotion mislabeled. For example, because the 
physiological discomforts created by anger are virtually the same as 
those created by fear, cognitive attribution of "anger" or "fear" as the 
emotional state may be incorrect. Yet the detection of the strong emo-
tional experience of another is a part of the meaning of an interaction 
or a phenomenon. Interpretation of that meaning, however, takes pa-
tience and sorting through, in order to understand the emotional state 
and what it means to the person experiencing it.29 Moreover, it is quite 
possible to misattribute causal explanations or interpretations to an 
emotion, which can lead to inaccurate empathy.3o 
The second common meaning of empathy is the one often referred 
to in psychotherapeutic literature: the understanding of the situation 
of another. "The function of empathy is to help one understand and 
relate to another person."31 It is embodied in the idealized vision of 
the field anthropologist or participant-observer sociologist who under-
stands totally, through empathic "magic," the meanings, concepts, 
and way of being of a culture or group. 32 Total understanding may be 
unachievable because of the social learning and cultural baggage the 
ethnographer, sociologist, or psychotherapist carries with her, yet it is 
an important mode of understanding the Other. 33 This second form of 
29. See Agosta, supra note 27, at 54-55. Agosta describes empathy as a two-step process: 
"First, it involves a representation of another's feeling. . . . Second, it entails a representation of 
the other as such as the source of the first representation [of another's feeling]." Id. at 55. Fi-
nally, identification of the feeling is necessary. It could be said that empathy of this nature has 
three components, two cognitive and one affective: (1) the ability to identify and label the feeling 
states of others; (2) the ability to assume the perspective of others; and (3) "a capacity for emo-
tional responsiveness." P. MUSSEN, J. CONGER, J. KAGAN & A. HUSTON, CHILD DEVELOP-
MENT AND PERSONALITY 311 (6th ed. 1984) [hereinafter CHILD DEVELOPMENT]. 
30. Because we frequently misattribute causal explanations for our own emotional states, it 
seems highly likely that we will do so in assessing the source of another's emotional state -
although, arguably, we will be more "objective" about the state of another. See D. WESTEN, 
SELF & SOCIETY 51-52 (1985). 
31. Id. at 94. 
32. See c. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 55-59 (1983), for an amusing criticism of em-
pathic "magic" in anthropology/ethnography. 
33. In short, accounts of other peoples' subjectivities can be built up without recourse to 
pretensions to more-than-normal capacities for ego effacement and fellow feeling. Normal 
capacities in these respects are, of course, essential •..• But whatever accurate or half-
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empathy is the foundation of what philosophers refer to as 
"intersubjectivity." 
An early developmental form of empathy as understanding the sit-
uation of the Other exists in what has been termed "conceptual per-
spective taking" - the capacity to perceive others as having their own 
goals, interests, and affects.34 Without empathy developed minimally, 
we would have the war of all against all or sociopathy. But beyond 
minimal conceptual perspective taking, empathy of this second type 
becomes historical, experiential, emotional, and cognitive.35 It illumi-
nates the situations of others. This form of empathy is not a dissolu-
tion of "ego boundaries" or absorption of self by other - it.is a means 
of relating to another or making another intelligible. 36 A form of this 
kind of empathy is imaginative experiencing of the situation of an-
other. 37 It is not the same as "getting it," as the "aha" experience, but 
it gives important clues to understanding. A means of imaginative ex-
periencing is to analogize from similar experiences of one's own (some-
thing, by the way, at which one would expect lawyers to be adept 
given their use of analogy in argument and reasoning). 38 
The third meaning of empathy that is commonly used is that of 
sympathy, care, or compassion, captured in Hoffman's notion of "an 
empathic distress response" - "an aversive [e.g., uncomfortable] af-
fect that can result from the discrepancy between some desired state of 
accurate sense one gets ... comes from the ability to construe their modes of expression ... 
which such an acceptance allows one to work toward developing. 
Id. at 70. 
34. J. BOWLBY, ATIACHMENT 368-70 (2d ed. 1982). 
35. For example, 
[e]mpathy is not an all-or-none quality of a child. It varies with the situation, the child's 
experience, and the people to whom the child is responding. In general, children show more 
empathy for people who are similar to themselves .... Perhaps it is easier to put oneself in 
the place of someone who is obviously similar. Children are also more apt to be empathic 
when they see someone in a situation they have experienced themselves than when they lack 
that experience. 
CHILD DEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 312. 
36. D. WESrEN, supra note 30, at 94. 
37. Kennedy makes this point in his discussion of the intuition that someone is "suffering 
from some form of false consciousness . . . . The actor's sense that the other's consciousness is 
false is an intuition of error . . . . The basis of this kind of intuition is one's own experience of 
being mistaken .... " Kennedy, supra note 20, at 638. Analogizing, or drawing upon one's own 
experience to understand another's feelings or experiences, is a part of relating to another, if for 
no other reason than that no one has exactly the same experiences as anyone else. But this is an 
obvious point. The less obvious point is that it is possible to draw on one's own similar exper-
iences to understand another. One could. otherwise not empathize with another's grief at losing a 
parent at all if one could not draw on one's own experiences of loss, or empathize with another's 
joy at winning an important prize if one had never had a pleasant surprise. See also A. 
BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY 66 (1977). 
38. I base this on the fact that legal reasoning frequently relies upon analogy; so that lawyers 
frequently are able to say situation X is more like situation Y than situation Z Of course, this 
may be a purely "cognitive" use of analogy. 
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welfare of an object ... and perceived/cognized reality."39 This dis-
tress can lead to action in order to help or alleviate the pain of an-
other.40 It is this form of empathy that is linked to action and 
altruistic behavior. Yet, "[t]he relationship between action and the 
sharing offeelings is obviously not a simple or direct one,"41 and while 
empathy may lead to helping behavior, it does not necessarily do so. 
Indeed, a person feeling the distress of another may find ways of 
blocking the experienced distress by thinking of other things, rational-
izing nonaction by rules or limits, or withdrawal. 42 Thus there is not a 
direct causal relationship between empathy and helping behavior, but 
a connection between empathy and helping or altruistic behavior does 
exist.43 
Several "myths" about empathy have perhaps interfered with un-
derstanding of the phenomenon, making it more difficult to elucidate 
what empathic knowledge is. The most prevalent myth in recent 
scholarship is that women are "naturally" more empathic than men. 
Nancy Chodorow has claimed that empathy is "built into" the pri-
mary definition of self for girls. 44 Carol Gilligan's work also is widely 
cited for the proposition that empathy is a part of female moral judg-
ment. 45 "The recent scholarly emergence and revaluation of epistemo-
logical and ethical perspectives that have been identified as feminine 
... claim a natural foundation for knowledge ... in closeness, con-
nectedness, and empathy."46 The confusion may lie in the way "em-
pathy" is used in the literature: Gilligan, in emphasizing an "ethic of 
care," that is, an "ethic of responsibility rest[ing] on an understanding 
that gives rise to compassion and care,"47 and in describing the sensi-
tivity to the needs of others and care for the feelings of others often 
39. D. WESTEN, supra note 30, at 39. 
40. Id. at 121. 
41. E. STOTLAND, S. SHERMAN & K. SHAVER, EMPATHY AND BIRTH ORDER 2 (1971) 
[hereinafter EMPATHY AND BIRTH ORDER]; see also sources cited in note 43 infra. 
42. Hoffman, The Development of Empathy, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR: SO· 
CIAL, PERSONALITY AND DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES 41, 44, 54-55 (J. Ruston & R. Sor-
rentino eds. 1981) [hereinafter ALTRUISM PERSPECTIVES]; D. WESTEN, supra note 30, at 35. 
43. See generally Batson & Coke, Empathy: A Source of Altruistic Motivation for Helping?, in 
ALTRUISM PERSPECTIVES, supra note 42, at 167; Hoffman, supra note 42, at 41; Aronfreed, The 
Socialization of Altruistic and Sympathetic Behavior: Some Theoretical and Experimental Analy-
ses, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME 
ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 103 (J. MacCaulay & L. Berkowitz eds. 1970) [hereinafter 
ALTRUISM STUDIES). 
44. N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING 167 (1978). 
45. See c. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). 
46. Bordo, The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought, 11 SIGNS 439, 455 (1986). 
47. See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 45, at 164. 
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learned by little girls, 48 invites the conclusion that empathy (particu-
larly if it is mistakenly confused with compassion or care) is the do-
main of the female in American society. Yet the literature of empathy 
shows little sex difference in either children or adults. 49 Ability to em-
pathize seems to be strongly influenced by socialization, learning, and 
early childhood experiences with separation and attachment, how-
ever. 50 To the extent that little girls are encouraged always to think of 
others, to be responsible for anticipating and taking care of the needs 
of others, and to be responsible for the emotional realm, they may be 
more likely to develop their empathic skills, but there simply isn't any 
real confirmation of this. 
Later experience may influence empathic capacity as well. 
Bandura, in discussing empathy, notes that "[p]eople who have suf-
fered pain are more likely to personalize the suffering of others and 
thus be more strongly affected by it. In studies ... observers who have 
undergone prior painful experiences learn more through socially medi-
ated suffering than observers who have experienced only mild unpleas-
antness or none at all .... "51 Humans seemingly have an innate 
capacity for empathy, but its development depends on learning and 
experience. 52 
A second myth is that empathy always produces altruistic, helping, 
or caring responses. Duncan Kennedy seems to accept this link in his 
Paternalism article, for example.53 The relationship of empathy to al-
truism is more complex than directly causal, however. While it is true 
that repeated studies seem to validate the relation of lack of empathy 
to sociopathic persons, 54 empathic responses do not inevitably elicit 
helping behavior. The altruistic behavior of high empathizers who are 
distressed by the suffering of others is contingent upon such factors as 
their skills, the means available to them, and their alternatives. 55 If 
the means for helping are lacking, high empathizers may avoid dealing 
48. Id. at 165. 
49. See E. MACCOBY & c. JACKLIN, 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES 211-14, 349 
(1974); Hoffman, supra note 42, at 52-53; cf. M.F. BELENKY, B.M. CLINCHY, N.R. 
GOLDBERBER & J.M. TARULE, WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING 102-03, 113 (1986) ("connected 
knowing," the basis of which is capacity for empathy, "not gender-specific"). 
50. See Hoffman, supra note 42, at 59; EMPATHY AND BIRTH ORDER, supra note 41, at 11-
12; J. BOWLBY, supra note 34, at 368-70; CHILD DEVELOPMENT, supra note 29, at 313. 
51. A. BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION: A SOCIAL COGNI-
TIVE THEORY 316 (1986). 
52. See sources cited in note 50 supra. People can learn to be more empathic, it appears. See 
S. NATALE, AN EXPERIMENT IN EMPATHY 71 (1972). 
53. Kennedy, supra note 20. 
54. A. BANDURA, supra note 51, at 316. 
55. Id. at 314. 
1584 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1574 
with suffering altogether because it is too upsetting.56 Extreme em-
pathic distress may divert attention from a victim to oneself, or it may 
lead to nonaltruistic behavior, to blaming the victim, to thinking about 
something else, or to deferring to an authority.57 
A third "myth" about empathy is that it entails a dissolution of 
ego boundaries, a loss of self. This may be more true of the phenome-
non now relegated to the word sympathy - a flooding of feeling, emo-
tion, pain, without a cognitive component. Empathy, however, is the 
foundational phenomenon for intersubjectivity,58 which is not absorp-
tion by the other, but rather simply the relationship of self to other, 
individual to community. 
The final myth is that empathy leads to moral or decisional paraly-
sis: thus, for example, we refuse to empathize with the criminal be-
cause to do so raises the level of awareness of moral ambiguity present 
in so many crimes, and we therefore block from our awareness the 
enormous brutalization done to a human being before he or she be-
comes a "criminal." Yet it is not impossible both to empathize with 
the suffering that often produces the sociopath and to accept the neces-
sity of removing him or her from society.59 Understanding may also 
free one from moral paralysis. In any event, whoever pretends moral 
choice is easy is ignoring the fact that sometimes - many times -
moral choice is a choice among evils. 60 
The reality of empathy is that we are more likely to empathize 
with people similar to ourselves, 61 and that such empathic understand-
ing may be so automatic that it goes unnoticed: elites will empathize 
with the experience of elites, men empathize with men, women with 
women, whites with whites. I would call this "unreflective" empathy. 
Empathy for those unlike oneself is, indeed, "more work," but cer-
tainly it is not impossible - as the discussions of Brown, Shapiro, and, 
to a lesser extent, Roe v. Wade, will illustrate. 
It may also be that there are some individuals or groups with 
whom we simply can't empathize - Hitler, SS guards - but we 
should definitely ask ourselves first why we cannot empathize. We 
may choose not to attempt empathy for moral reasons, although ar-
56. Id. at 314-15; Hoffman, supra note 42, at 55. 
57. Hoffman, supra note 42, at 57-58. 
58. Agosta, supra note 27, at 43-44. 
59. See A. MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD (1983), especially pages 198-239, for a particu-
larly powerful discussion of this point. 
60. W. KAUFMANN, WITHOUT GUILT AND JUSTICE 3-4 (1973); A. MACINTYRE, AF!'ER 
VIRTUE 224 (2d ed. 1984). 
61. EMPATHY AND BIRTH ORDER, supra note 41, at 124-25; CHILD DEVELOPMENT, supra 
note 29, at 312. 
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guably understanding how and why Nazism was so attractive to the 
German people, or how and why lynchings were and are so attractive 
to members of the KKK, is important to preventing those evils from 
recurring. The fear that to understand all is to forgive all has led 
Bruno Bettelheim to state in a review of a study of Nazi doctors by 
Robert Lifton: "I believe there are acts so vile that our task is to reject 
and prevent them, not to try to understand them empathetically 
•••• "
62 No one should quarrel with Dr. Bettelheim's choice given his 
own experience in a Nazi concentration camp, but in arguing that the 
task is to prevent, he undermines his claim that there is no need to 
understand. 
In a different way, I cannot empathize totally with the pain of 
blacks in racist societies, because I am white, and my whiteness both 
protects me and has influenced me at levels to which I do not have 
ready access. 63 Yet does that excuse me from reading black literature, 
hearing black pain and joy, listening to the experience of blacks as 
blacks? Does that mean I should not attempt an empathic under-
standing because it cannot be total? Or will my increased understand-
ing allow me to be a more responsible moral agent, a more effective 
lawyer/law professor, a better legal decisionmaker? To the extent I 
understand what it is I face, I understand my moral options. I simply 
cannot pretend absolute certainty. 
What about the role empathy may play in producing morally hor-
rible results? To the extent Hitler understood the experience, pain, 
and desires of Germans, it may be that he was able to manipulate 
them. Or consider Bernard Williams' example: The sadist has access 
to the feelings and experiences of another and exploits that under-
standing to inflict pain most effectively. Williams claims: "But one 
thing that must be true is that the insightful understanding of others' 
feelings possessed by the sympathetic person is possessed in much the 
same form by the sadistic or cruel person; that is one way in which the 
cruel are distinguished from the brutal or indifferent."64 Perhaps it is 
this abuse of empathic knowledge that is captured in the commonplace 
"you always hurt the one you love." Yet this does not refute the fact 
that "sympathetic identification with others ... [is] basic to ethical 
experience."65 Rather than negate the validity of empathy, Williams 
62. Bettelheim, Their Specialty Was Murder, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1986, § 7 (Book Review), 
at l, 62 (reviewing R. LIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS (1986)) (emphasis added). 
63. For an excellent discussion of the subtle and "unconscious" influences of culture on ra-
cial attitudes, see Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
64. B. WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 91 (1985). 
65. Id. at 90. 
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simply reflects the truism that all knowledge is vulnerable to abuse. 
And it just does not seem to be the case that empathic understanding 
frequently leads directly to moral evil, because empathic understand-
ing necessarily involves recognition of and regard for the other. Yet it 
may often indirectly lead to moral evil, if the empathizer becomes 
overwhelmed by the pain presented and hence retreats from, ducks, or 
ignores that pain. 
Empathic responses are most likely to occur in situations of direct 
relationship to another, where concrete interaction occurs and incen-
tive for understanding exists. This is not to say that they cannot occur 
where no relationship exists - the distress of a stranger may trigger 
an empathic distress response, for example. With a stranger, however, 
it is more likely that the individual experiencing the aversive response 
will minimize it "through various cognitive mechanisms . . . such as 
thinking about something else."66 Individuals also can be desensitized 
to empathic distress, and studies have shown individuals will have re-
duced empathic distress if they are instructed to view a victim in a 
detached way. 67 Moreover, empathic distress is unlikely to occur if 
the one in distress is not seen as a human or like oneself. 68 
Empathic experiencing of emotion is probably influenced by cul-
tural messages about which nonverbal and even verbal cues manifest 
particular emotions. Thus emotions are misunderstood cross-cultur-
ally. A Japanese woman may giggle when frightened - which to an 
American caucasian conveys entirely the wrong emotional message. 
Finally, affect plus cognition - empathy as a means of understanding 
and relating to another - is undoubtedly less difficult in instances of 
shared cultural experiences than in unfamiliar ones. As Geertz has 
noted, however, that does not mean an ethnographer, for example, 
should not strive to understand the experiences of those in a culture: 
only that she should recognize that understanding will always be only 
partial.69 
While these definitions and uses of empathy may initially sound 
foreign to us as members of the legal culture because of law's concern 
with social control and its commitment to rationality, predictability, 
and generalizability, empathy occasionally does surface in legal deci-
sions. But before turning to some examples, it is necessary to examine 
66. D. WESTEN, supra note 30, at 35; see also A. BANDURA, supra note 37, at 67. 
67. D. WESTEN, supra note 30, at 35. 
68. Hoffman, supra note 42, at 57-58; cf Lerner, The Desire for Justice and Reactions to 
Victims, in ALTRUISM STUDIES, supra note 43, at 205. 
69. See GEERTZ, supra note 32, at 70. See also Kirschner, "Then What Have I to do with 
Thee'~· 011 Identity, Fieldwork, and Ethnographic Knowledge, 2 CULTURAL ANTHRO., May 
1987, at 211; note 35 supra. 
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the aspects of the legal culture that may delegitimate empathic 
knowledge. 
B. Legality 
Legality, laws, and legal actors can and do respond to human pain 
at times, as I shall argue in the discussions of Brown and Shapiro. In 
fact, legal doctrine can be placed in service to empathy, as happened in 
the area of desegregation once the Court abandoned Plessy v. Fergu-
son 70 and developed the doctrine that separation of the races violated 
the equal protection clause. 71 I do not question that law can serve to 
promote individual freedom and worth under some circumstances. 
But in this section I am concerned to_ show the myriad ways in which 
notions of the Rule of Law and legality provide a way to avoid em-
pathic understanding and a way to deny moral choice in legal 
decisionmaking. 
Much in the nature of legality can block empathic understand-
ing. 72 The structures and beliefs about law that constitute "legality" 
may allow legal decisionmakers to be relatively unreflective about 
their choice to ignore empathic phenomena. A value of legality in 
American culture is that the Rule of Law opposes some Hobbesian 
free-for-all. The Rule of Law is the reification of rules governing 
rights and duties to which we pay homage: thus, this is a "govern-
ment of laws, not men"; the Rule of Law transcends humans and is 
superior to them. The virtue of the Rule of Law is that it is ostensibly 
"neutral" and prevents abuse of persons. The neutrality and general-
ity of the Rule of Law seek to serve the goals of protecting individuals 
from arbitrary treatment and of respecting people as autonomous and 
equal. As such it is not in direct opposition to empathy. Yet to the 
extent the concern is with perpetuating the Rule of Law for its own 
sake, the importance of empathic understanding can disappear. 
Essential to legality is the premise that fidelity to the law is neces-
sary for predictability and control over outcomes and for social order-
ing. The Rule of Law provides us with an anchor, a grounding, that 
otherwise would not exist in modern postindustrial society; it keeps 
chaos and anarchy away from our door. Rules - whether explicit or 
70. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
71. See notes 176-214 infra and accompanying text. 
72. My use of the term "legality" resembles Judith Shklar's definition of "legalism": "the 
ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relation· 
ships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules." J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 1 (1964). 
Legalism "is what gives legal thinking its distinctive flavor on a vast variety of social occasions, 
in all kinds of discourse .... Legalism is, above all, the operative outlook of the legal profession, 
both bench and bar." Id. at 8. 
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open-textured - provide the illusion, if not the reality, of certainty; 
that certainty is reason enough to obey or acquiesce to the Rule of 
Law without question. For this reason the narrative of the suffering 
caused by the law to the Other can be ignored or suppressed. 
The values oflegality also can block empathic understanding. Pro-
fessor Grey has termed legality's persistent values "completeness, for-
mality, and conceptual ordering."73 To this one might add autonomy 
from other structures and institutions of society. This "legal science" 
prevents ad hoc decisionmaking, and promotes "certainty, predictabil-
ity and accountability of legal decision generally."74 Formality, or 
"formalism," stresses "the importance of rationally uncontroversial 
reasoning in legal decision, whether from highly particular rules or 
quite abstract principles."75 As Unger has described this characteris-
tic of legality: 
A system of rules is formal insofar as it allows its . . . interpreters to 
justify their decisions by reference to the rules themselves and to the 
presence or absence of facts stated by the rules . . . . Everything will 
depend on where one draws the line between the factors of decision that 
are intrinsic to the system, and therefore worthy of consideration, and 
those that are not. 76 
Law as a closed system that is self-referential can draw the line in such 
a way as to dismiss empathic discourse or understanding as "irrele-
vant" or as "policy" argument beyond the auspices of the law.77 It 
can also preclude the discourse entirely by mechanical application of 
rules, either by bureaucratic formalization and routinization78 - the 
"checklist" method of decisions with legal consequences - or by judi-
cial formalization.79 (One is tempted to characterize this form oflegal 
decisionmaking as the "garbage in, garbage out" method.) 
An example of the effect of bureaucratic legal formality on em-
pathic communication is contained in Professor Simon's critique of 
welfare reform. so Simon argues that the creation of a formalized, rule-
bound approach to eligibility determination for the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program created "indifference, im-
73. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 42 (1983). 
74. Id. at 41. 
75. Id. at 9. 
76. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 204 (1976) (emphasis added). 
77. Id. 
78. See Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 
1225-40 (1983). 
79. See Resnik, Managerial Judging, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); Nagel, The Formulaic 
Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985). 
80. Simon, supra note 78. 
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personality, and irresponsibility."81 While the formalization of AFDC 
rules and procedures "seem[s] to have reduced the claimant's experi-
ence of oppressive and punitive moralism, of invasion of privacy, and 
of dependence on idiosyncratic personal favor ... [it] also [has] re-
duced their experience of trust and personal care and [has] increased 
their experience of bewilderment and opacity."82 Front-line eligibility 
workers view the people they are to serve as threats or nuisances;83 
applicants are burdened with chasing down documentation from mul-
tiple bureaucracies84 and undoubtedly feel unheard and powerless. An 
effect of the formality is to render assistance "less sensitive to the cir-
cumstances of the applicant"85 than under the earlier, less formal sys-
tem. There is little understanding of clients by workers or workers by 
clients. As a result, empathic understanding is lost, and many suffer 
denials of assistance even though they are indeed eligible for it, be-
cause they fail to jump through the necessary "bureaucratic hoops." 
The form of abuse in the administration of AFDC that existed before 
the institution of legalistic and formalized standards and procedures 
has been replaced by another form of abuse: an unreflective reliance 
on rules.86 
Similarly, the doctrinal development of the procedures for impos-
ing the death penalty offers the opportunity to avoid empathic under-
standing by resorting to rules, as suggested in an article by Professor 
Weisberg. 87 In California, at least, prosecutors take "full advantage of 
the doctrinal formality of the penalty trial to make the case for death 
in the most lawyerly, legalistic, dispassionate form. The prosecutor 
often reinforces the judge's instructions that ifthe formula of fact-find-
ing produces a certain result, the jury has a duty to vote for death."88 
Thus, formalistically, all a jury need do is add up aggravating circum-
stances and subtract mitigating ones; the law then tells the jury 
whether death is the logical penalty. Professor Weisberg correctly ob-
serves that this formalistic discourse places the defense at a disadvan-
81. Id. at 1198. 
82. Id. at 1221. 
83. Id. at 1222. 
84. Id. at 1205. 
85. Id. at 1204. 
86. Id. at 1219-22. 
87. Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. Cr. RE.v. 305. See also Note, Death and a 
Rational Justi'ce: A Conversation on the Capital Jurisprudence of Justice John Paul Stevens. 96 
YALE L.J. 521 (1987). 
88. Weisberg, supra note 87, at 375. See also Hitchcock v. Dugger, 107 S. Ct. 1821, 1824 
(1987) (Florida advisory jury told by prosecutor "'to consider mitigating circumstances and 
consider those by number'"; judge imposed death sentence because "there [were] insufficient 
[enumerated] mitigating circumstances ... to outweigh the aggravating circumstances."). 
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tage and gives the jury a convenient way to avoid or escape the moral 
choice of whether to sentence the defendant to death. 89 While the de-
fense will seek to have the jury empathize with the defendant, the de-
fense narrative - unattached to legal form - is a difficult one to 
convey, and the legalistic formula can provide sanctuary from moral 
anxiety.90 
Apart from these particularized examples of legality's ability to 
provide refuge from empathy, more general characteristics of the legal 
actor's belief system can serve to block empathic understanding and 
moral choice. Fidelity to rules and to the autonomy of a legal system, 
and belief in its internal coherence, can support a judicial 
decisionmaker's avoidance of empathy and of his responsibility for 
human pain caused by law. As the late Professor Cover noted in his 
study of judicial responses to slavery: 
The judicial conscience is an artful dodger and rightfully so. Before it 
will concede that a case is one that presents a moral dilemma, it will hide 
in the nooks and crannies of the professional ethics, run to the cave of 
role limits, seek the shelter of separation of powers.91 
In other words, legality gives judges a number of ways to block human 
pain and escape responsibility. Thus, a judge who believed himself to 
have chosen "fidelity to law" as a "higher value" could discount any 
moral concern about enforcing fugitive slave laws.92 Mechanistic 
application of the law - applying "the law and the law alone" - was 
a "retreat to formalism" that sheltered the judge from recognizing the 
horror of keeping human beings in bondage.93 Personal responsibility 
for choice was subsumed under strict adherence to the law as literally 
interpreted, or as coming from a higher authority, with the deci-
sionmaker serving as a mere conduit: "I do not make law, I follow 
it."94 Displacing responsibility for the decision to another 
decisionmaker was attractive as well, enabling the decisionmaker to 
retreat behind "separation of powers."95 Thus, the problem of fugitive 
slave laws was for the people, or the legislature, or the executive to 
solve. Cover also described the "judicial can't" - the judge's claim 
that he simply did not have the power to avoid enforcing an evil law 
89. Weisberg, supra note 87, at 379-83. 
90. Weisberg, supra note 87, at 388-95; Note, supra note 87, at 546 ("[The People] have a 
right to know - indeed, if you are sensibly to consider their values in applying the Eighth 
Amendment, they must know - the nature of the choice."). 
91. R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 201 (1975). 
92. Id. at 229-30. 
93. Id. at 233-34. 
94. Id. at 232-36. 
95. Id. at 236. 
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- as a way around moral choice and perhaps empathic understand-
ing. 96 While it is possible that judges made a moral choice in favor of 
legality, it is equally probable that legality, that the doctrine of per-
sons-as-property, foreclosed their consideration of the moral issues. 
And because abolitionist lawyers did their best to portray their clients 
as humans with human stories, it is highly probable that many judges 
did revert to legality to avoid facing the moral dimensions of the 
problem.97 
Fidelity to doctrine can justify caution as well. Because legal deci-
sions have consequences, because they do at times affect behavior be-
yond that of the parties to the dispute, and because people do rely on 
judgments, constantly changing the rules would be deeply destabi-
lizing. Yet the reassurance of predictability of outcome provided by 
consistent adherence to doctrine over time is perhaps more illusory 
than real. While doctrine can and does provide grounding and bound-
aries for decisions, it is not immutable. 
Legal categories - whether created by doctrine, statute, or consti-
tution - will define legal discourse, will indicate what is "relevant" 
and what is not.98 Thus, legal discourse determined by category will 
often foreclose the narrative of experience of "out-groups" affected by 
a legal rule or doctrine. A stereotype - a belief that "acts both as a 
justificatory device for categorical acceptance or rejection of a group, 
and as a screening or selective device to maintain simplicity in percep-
tion and in thinking"99 - embodied in a legal category can most cer-
tainly block empathic knowledge. 
These characteristics of legality provide ample opportunity for 
"not hearing" the story of the Other, but they do not inexorably com-
pel that result. They may submerge or mask awareness of moral 
choice and discourage reflexivity in the dialogue of law, but they need 
not do so. While abstract legal categories can strip persons of their 
very humanity, the narrative of that humanity often can also find a 
place in a legal category. For example, the categories of equal protec-
96. Id. at 122-23. 
97. Id. at 216 ("Playing upon the potential for empathy, the abolitionists always tried to 
personify the victims . . . . "). 
98. This is obviously true of any form of normal discourse that establishes its structures and 
conventions for the purposes of communicating with one another and using categories to organ-
ize information. Yet legal categories can "freeze" human experience and reality unreflectively 
under the practice of legality. For a good discussion of how common ways of structuring rele-
vant discourse define how we solve problems with "stock stories," see Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984). 
99. G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 192 (1st ed. 2d printing 1954). 
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tion analysis have demonstrated this receptivity - or lack of it - to 
the particular narratives of blacks, the poor, women, and gays. 
It may seem intuitively "obvious" that empathy can take place at 
the "lower" levels of the legal system - say, in the attorney/client 
relationship or in trials. But empathy, by nature of its very concrete-
ness, seems out of place in the appellate court world. The connection 
to persons and concrete situations that leads to empathic response 
does grow more attenuated at the appellate level. But this does not 
mean that appellate courts and even the Supreme Court do not occa-
sionally show evidence in their opinions that empathy has been opera-
tive in their decisions: The language of empathic understanding, of 
feeling the feelings of the people affected by a case, occasionally sur-
faces. Whether empathic responses helped an appellate judge reach a 
decision that is then justified in terms of legal discourse is often diffi-
cult to know: Of all the powerful decisionmaking agents in American 
political life, a judge's decisionmaking process is the least understood. 
But there may be some truth in Edmond Cahn's observation that "if 
you wish a judge to overturn a settled and established rule of law, you 
must convince both his mind and his emotions, which together in in-
dissociable blend constitute his sense of injustice."100 
The argumentative steps taken to convey human situations to a 
judge might be described as creating affective understanding by use of 
a narrative that includes emotion and description ("thick" description, 
if you wil1)101 of a human situation created by, resulting from, orig-
nored by legal structures, and consciously placing that narrative 
within a legal framework. I shall refer to such arguments as "em-
pathic narratives" in the remainder of this article. Empathic narra-
tive, as I hope to demonstrate, includes descriptions of concrete 
human situations and their meanings to the persons affected in the 
context of their lives. It is contextual, descriptive, and affective narra-
tive, although it need not be "emotional" in the pejorative sense of 
overwrought. It is, instead, the telling of the stories of persons and 
human meanings, not abstractions; it is a phenomenological argument. 
The following discussion of three Supreme Court decisions in 
which signs of empathy may be found, or where the footprints of em-
pathic narratives that evoke empathic responses exist, illustrates the 
(theoretically unrecognized) role that empathy has had in what could 
be considered politically and legally volatile situations. The fourth 
Supreme Court case provides an illustration of the effect of absence of 
100. E. CAHN, THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMOCRATIC MAN 129 (1961). 
101. C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 6-28 (1973). 
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empathic understanding. The discussion of these cases relies heavily 
on the narratives contained in the briefs and oral arguments, with par-
ticular reliance on quotation rather than paraphrase in order to recap-
ture the stories and nuances as accurately as possible. The nuances of 
wording, the rhythm of discourse, the tones of the oral arguments can-
not be reproduced directly, nor did I view the actual arguments, 102 yet 
it is important to try to represent faithfully the narratives used in or-
der to convey the presence or absence of empathic phenomena at the 
time the cases were argued and decided. 
III. EXAMPLES OF EMPATHIC NARRATIVE: THE 
DISCOURSE OF "OTHERNESS" 
The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education 
(I) 103 illustrates the existence of empathic understanding in the 
Supreme Court, leading to a transformation of legal understanding, an 
opening of opportunities for new legal categories and interpretations. 
The Court's decisions affecting the poor illustrate a tension between 
traditional legal thinking and narrative and the realm of empathic re-
sponse.104 The Court's abortion decisions show yet another combina-
tion: an empathic response to the fetuses may have negated the 
empathic response to the situation of women. 105 Finally, the Court's 
recent decision upholding Georgia's sodomy statute illustrates the ef-
fect of empathic failure.106 
A. Brown v. Board of Education 
Richard K.luger's study, Simple Justice, 107 the arguments, and the 
language of the Brown opinion itself provide extensive evidence of the 
affective message presented in the case - and the resulting under-
standing of the meaning of being black in a racist American culture-
that led the Court to reverse Plessy in principle, if not in literal terms. 
Brown v. Board of Education (I) may seem to be overworked as an 
example of the good in constitutional adjudication (a cynic might say 
it is the only example); 108 from the ambivalent perspective of the 
102. I was able to listen to tape recordings of the arguments in Shapiro and Roe to capture 
some of the expressive nuances. After many months of trying, I was unable to obtain a recording 
of Bowers in time for this article. 
103. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
104. See text at notes 260-92 infra. 
105. See text at notes 326-44 infra. 
106. See text at notes 451-62 infra. 
107. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976). 
108. The cynic may be right. See Kennedy, Race Relations Law and The Tradition of Cele-
bration: The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 (1986). 
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1980s, Brown I may appear trite, or the product of a simpler age, or so 
clear-cut that no other result would be conceivable. Yet none of these 
particular objections is valid given the context of the decision. 109 
Brown I was remarkable, and it remains so, in large part because it is a 
human opinion responding to the pain inflicted on outsiders by the 
law. In Brown, legality in its many forms clashed with empathy, and 
empathy ultimately transformed legality. The Supreme Court Jus-
tices' understanding of racism was radically illuminated; as a result, 
the Court subsequently delegitimatized segregation in a series of deci-
sions known as "the per curiams."11° 
Moreover, the Court's opinion itself speaks of feeling, of human 
pain, and of moral evil. The recognition of human experience and 
pain - of feeling - is obvious: "To separate [school children] from 
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race gen-
erates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that 
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone."111 
The opinion, varying as it did from the established form, was im-
mediately and repeatedly attacked by legal scholars and the legal and 
political communities.112 The favorite criticism was trashing the so-
cial scientific evidence that segregation stigmatized and harmed black 
children; 113 there were also cries for "neutral principles" against ·~udi­
cial legislation" 114 and attacks on the opinion's departure from estab-
lished form. 115 Yet Brown I as a symbol of human dignity, of law as 
agent for the good, can hardly be questioned. The Court understood 
109. Ronald Dworkin is just wrong when he asserts that upholding segregation would have 
been "almost unanimously rejected" by the American people in 1954 "as not faithful to their 
convictions about racial justice." R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 387 (1986). Instead, racism and 
segregation were alive and well and very much a part of American convictions, as Kluger and 
others have so ably demonstrated. See generally R. KLUGER, supra note 107; R. ELLISON, IN· 
VISIBLE MAN (1953); J. BALDWIN, NOBODY KNOWS MY NAME (1961); see also G. ALLPORT, 
supra note 99, at 462-77. 
llO. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Mayor of Baltimore v. 
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Gayle v. Browder, 
352 U.S. 903 (1956); New Orleans City Park Improvements Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958). 
The per curiams were criticized as "unprincipled" by one of the leading legalistic critics of 
Brown, Herbert Wechsler. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1959). 
111. 347 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added). 
112. "Few opinions of the Supreme Court have been more controversial than Chief Justice 
Warren's .... Any decision dealing with so sensitive an issue was bound to be controversial, but 
both the reasoning and the style of Brown were criticized even by commentators who supported 
the outcome." P. BREST & s. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISJONMAKING 
431 (2d ed. 1983); see also R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 710-14. 
113. See, e.g., Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 (1955). 
114. Wechsler, supra note 110. 
l15. See R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 711. 
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the experience of being black in a racist culture, and even if it quickly 
backed away from the obvious implications of that understanding, the 
case transformed American constitutional law. 
Kluger's book chronicles the painstaking work of the NAACP and 
its lawyers to create a different narrative about racism for the Court 
and to create the conditions for empathic understanding. 116 Brown I 
was not the first case in which the Court was made aware of the effects 
of segregation. Sweatt v. Painter 117 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 11s 
cases involving the refusal to admit blacks to the University of Texas 
Law School and the graduate school of education at the University of 
Oklahoma, provided the background for Brown. Indeed, one com-
mentator has observed that McLaurin " 'provided the propulsive 
power of empathy and indignation' " in the school desegregation 
cases, because the Justices could identify more readily with a black 
graduate student than with blacks in general. 119 
There were three sets of arguments in Brown, two on the substan-
tive issue of the constitutional legitimacy of segregated schools, and 
one on the issue of the remedy. After the first set of arguments in 
1952, the Court, in a delaying maneuver inspired by Felix Frank-
furter,120 set the cases for reargument on five questions in 1953;121 in 
1955 the Court heard arguments on remedies.122 While the NAACP's 
tone changed from an empathic narrative to a more legalistic argu-
ment through the course of the three sets of arguments, those favoring 
the upholding of school segregation shifted from almost purely legal to 
consequentialist and emotional appeals. The counterpoint of legality 
and empathy that appeared starkly in 1952 began to blur in 1953, but 
in 1955 it reemerged. 
In the 1952 argument of the Brown Case itself, for example, coun-
sel for Kansas made a purely "legal" argument. He urged the Court 
to ignore the District Court's eighth finding of fact because it was "le-
gally insignificant" and immaterial "so far as the issues in this case are 
116. See id., especially at 508-40, 61746. 
117. 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (desegregating the University of Texas at Austin's Law School); see 
R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 260-66, 274-84. 
118. 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (forbidding the physical isolation of a black graduate student); see 
R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 266-69, 274-84. 
119. Kamisar, The School Desegregation Cases in Retrospect, in ARGUMENT xvi (L. Fried-
man ed. 1969) (quoting E. CAHN, THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMOCRATIC MAN 130 (1962)). For 
a history of the NAACP's legal strategy in school desegregation cases, see M. TUSHNET, THE 
NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987). 
120. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 614-16. 
121. 345 U.S. 972 (1953) (per curiam). 
122. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 729. 
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concemed."123 This was prescient, to say the least, for it was finding 
of fact number eight that found its way into the final opinion: 
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detri-
mental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it 
has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usu-
ally interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of 
inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the 
sanction oflaw, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and 
mental development of negro children .... 124 
Counsel for Kansas argued that because the physical facilities of 
the schools were equal, that ended the matter under the law. The psy-
chological reaction to segregation "is something which is something 
apart from the objective components of the school system, and some-
thing that the state does not have within its power to confer upon the 
pupils therein."125 Counsel essentially argued that legality precluded 
empathy. 
Because the arguments of Thurgood Marshall for the NAACP and 
John W. Davis for the state of South Carolina provide the greatest 
contrast in narratives, the remainder of the discussion of Brown will 
focus on their arguments. Having laid the groundwork in the Court 
before Brown, the NAACP, and particularly Thurgood Marshall, re-
peatedly in their arguments emphasized the narrative of the painful 
experience of being black in American society. Although Philip 
Elman has derogated the NAACP project and has claimed that 
"Thurgood Marshall could have stood up there and recited 'Mary had 
a little lamb,' and the result would have been exactly the same," the 
historical evidence and the arguments in the Brown case contradict his 
assertions.126 At oral argument, it was Marshall who returned repeat-
edly to the experience of segregation, the story of racism and its con-
tradictions, and the human pain inflicted by the law. In 1952, in 1953, 
and even in 1955, Marshall spoke not in conventional modes of legal 
argumentation (indeed, in 1953, he failed miserably in that dis-
course)127 but instead used the narrative of the experience, the harm, 
the evil, and the irrationality of racism. As Yale Kamisar has ob-
served, "If [John W.] Davis the mastercraftsman told the Court how to 
123. ARGUMENT, supra note 119, at 33. 
124. 347 U.S. at 494 (interpolation by the Court). 
125. ARGUMENT, supra note 119, at 33. 
126. Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 
1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 830-37, 852 (1987) (interview by Silber). 
Among other things, Elman claims the NAACP did not count votes on the Court and brought 
the cases too soon. These claims are contradicted by Kluger's and Tushnet's historical works. 
See R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 617-26; M. TUSHNET, supra note 119, at 105-37. 
127. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 669-70; see also ARGUMENT, supra note 119, at 194-206. 
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write an opinion reaffirming Plessy, Marshall, spokesman for an op-
pressed race, never let the Justices forget why they had to overrule 
it."128 
In 1952 Marshall, arguing in Briggs v. Elliot, 129 quickly summa-
rized the procedural posture of the case and stated the language of the 
South Carolina statutory and constitutional provisions mandating seg-
regated schools.130 He then moved to the story of the South Carolina 
case, pointing out that the state had conceded at the first hearing that 
physical facilities were unequal, but that notwithstanding the conces-
sion, appellants were arguing about something more than physical 
equality.131 Although the state had remedied the physical inequalities, 
Marshall took the position "that these statutes were unconstitutional 
in their enforcement because they not only produced these inevitable 
inequalities in physical facilities, but that evidence would be produced 
by expert witnesses to show that the governmentally imposed racial 
segregation in and of itself was also a denial of equality."132 The 
NAACP's experts had testified that there was no real difference be-
tween the ability of black and white children to learn, but that 
segregation deterred the development [of black childrens' personalities] 
.... [I]t destroys their self-respect .... [I]t denies them full opportunity 
for democratic social development .... [I]t stamps [the child] with a 
badge of inferiority. 
The summation of the testimony is that the Negro children have road 
blocks put up in their minds as a result of this segregation, so that the 
amount of education that they take in is much less .... 133 
Marshall went on to say that the District Court had ignored evi-
dence of the harm caused by segregation, that 
we have positive testimony from Dr. Clark that the humiliation that 
these children have been going through is the type of injury to the minds 
that will be permanent as long as they are in segregated schools, not 
theoretical injury, but actual injury.134 
Marshall in his opening argument fudged whether the Court had 
128. Kamisar, supra note 119, at xix (emphasis in original). 
129. The order of argument followed the ordering of the docket, with Brown v. Board of 
Education being the lead case. Briggs v. Elliot was the second of the five cases to be argued; 
presumably Marshall argued Briggs in part because he had litigated the case in the federal district 
court in South Carolina. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 302-05, 346-65, 570. Moreover, the fact 
that South Carolina had retained "the most accomplished and admired appellate lawyer in 
America," id. at 543, to argue its case undoubtedly influenced the decision to have the NAACP's 
most accomplished appellate lawyer argue in opposition to John W. Davis. 
130. ARGUMENT, supra note 119, at 36-37. 
131. Id. at 37. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 38. 
134. Id. at 42. 
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to overrule Plessy, 135 but he returned frequently to the fact that chil-
dren were harmed by the law of separate-but-equal to argue: "But my 
emphasis is that all we are asking for is to take off this state-imposed 
segregation. It is the state-imposed part of it that affects the individual 
children."136 
John Davis began with three points, all tied to settled legal doc-
trines. He argued first, that since the county had complied with the 
injunction to equalize the physical facilities, the case was moot; 137 sec-
ond, that the South Carolina laws did not violate the fourteenth 
amendment; 138 and finally, that the evidence produced by the NAACP 
"deals entirely with legislative policy, and does not tread on constitu-
tional right."139 Davis used analogy to attempt to take the bite out of 
racial separation by pointing to "reasonable" separations - sex, age, 
and "mental capacity" - thus illustrating the reasonableness of segre-
gation.140 Davis told the Court that it need not decide the case, having 
"so often and so recently dealt with this subject that it would be a 
work of supererogation to remind you of the cases ... or to argue with 
you, the authors, the meaning and scope of the opinions you have 
emitted."141 And later, in response to Justice Frankfurter's question-
ing about the openness of the language of the equal protection clause, 
Davis stated that "certainly this Court has spoken in the most clear 
and unmistakable terms to the effect that this segregation is not unlaw-
ful," 142 Sweatt and similar cases having been decided solely on the ba-
sis of physical inequality. He argued that "[i]t is a little late, ... after 
this question has been presumed to be settled for ninety years - it is a 
little late to argue that the question is still at large."143 This appeal to 
settled law, doctrine, and precedent captured the issues of predictabil-
ity and control that justify legality and that offered the Court an 
escape. 
Davis attacked the expert testimony Marshall had relied on, mock-
ing social science in general and attacking Dr. Kenneth Clark in par-
ticular.144 He pointed to the unfamiliarity of several witnesses with 
135. Id. at 42. 
136. Id. at 49. 
137. Id. at 51, 53-54. 
138. Id. at 51, 54-58. 
139. Id. at 51, 61. 
140. Id. at 51. He also made reference to Indians, id., perhaps hoping to play on prejudices 
against another oppressed group. 
141. Id. at 54. 
142. Id. at 57. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 58-59. 
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the South, and argued that history and other experts supported segre-
gated schools. 145 He effectively, if misleadingly and out of context, 
quoted from W.E.B. DuBois to support his claim that "If this question 
is a judicial question ... certainly it cannot be said that the testimony 
will be all one way." 146 He argued that, if anything, segregation of 
schools was a local, legislative matter, and his closing statements 
hinted at the Court's institutional incompetence to decide the issue.147 
Having stated at the beginning of his argument that the question of 
segregation was solely one of legislative policy - a separation of pow-
ers argument reminiscent of those relied on by judges upholding fugi-
tive slave laws - he returned to that point in closing. 14s 
In his rebuttal to Davis, Marshall observed: 
[S]o far as the appellants are concerned in this case, at this point it seems 
to me that the significant factor running through all these arguments up 
to this point is that for some reason, which is still unexplained, Negroes 
are taken out of the main stream of American life in these states. 149 
He followed up this assertion with an image to convey a meaning of 
segregation's impact to the Court, to anchor it in the Court's reality 
and experience: 
[O]n this question of the will of the people of South Carolina, if Ralph 
Bunche [the Nobel laureate] were assigned to South Carolina, his chil-
dren would have to go to a Jim Crow school. No matter how great 
anyone becomes, if he happens to have been born a Negro . . . he is 
relegated to that school. 150 
Marshall began to answer Davis' claim that the expert testimony 
used to demonstrate harm was "a legislative argument at best" by em-
phasizing that the state had not contradicted the testimony of the 
NAACP's experts that it now mocked. Justice Frankfurter inter-
rupted Marshall and asked "[c]an I not take judicial notice of Myr-
dal's book [Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma] without having 
him called as a witness?" 151 A discussion about the available evidence 
of the harmful consequences of segregation finally led Marshall to 
state: "I know of no scientist that has made any study . . . who does 
145. Id. at 59-60. He also emphasized the "enormous weight oflegislative and judicial prece-
dent on [the] subject" and stated that "much of that which is handed around under the name of 
social science is an effort on the part of the scientist to rationalize his own preconceptions. They 
find usually ... what they go out to find." Id. at 59. Thus, legality took precedence - especially 
over social science, which wasn't "real" science anyway. 
146. Id. at 60-61; see also R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 573-74. 
147. ARGUMENT, supra note 119, at 61. 
148. "I respectfully submit to the Court, there is no reason assigned here why this Court or 
any other should reverse the findings of ninety years." Id. 
149. Id. at 61-62. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 63. 
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not admit that segregation harms the child."152 
During Marshall's rebuttal, Justice Reed questioned him about the 
purpose of segregation. Had the legislatures in the South instituted 
segregation in order "to avoid racial friction"?153 Marshall's reply 
drew on his knowledge and experience, and it answered both the ques-
tion of the legitimacy of overriding legislative policy and whether, in 
fact, racial friction was an issue for the children involved. His reply 
also underscored what it meant to be black in the United States, to be 
excluded, to be disempowered: "But I think, considering the legisla-
tures, that we have to bear in mind that I know of no Negro legislator 
in any of these states, and I do not know whether they consider the 
Negro's side or not." And: 
I know in the South where I spent most of my time, you will see white 
and colored kids going down the road together to school. They separate 
and go to different schools, and they come out and they play together. I 
do not see why there would necessarily be any trouble if they went to 
school together. 154 
In 1953, the tone of argument for the prosegregation position 
changed somewhat. Counsel for Delaware characterized the 
NAACP's arguments as appeals to "emotion" and underscored the 
legalistic view that such an argument had no place in the Court: 
If I may borrow from a statement made by the venerable Mr. John W. 
Davis ... he said: "An emotional approach to this question is a poor 
substitute for a rational discussion of the problem at hand, which is to be 
judged by the application of well-settled principles governing the effect of 
the Fourteenth Amendment on the police power of the state." 
The arguments ... such as I have heard in this courtroom for three 
days by our adversaries, have great emotional appeal, but they belong in 
an entirely different forum and in a different setting. 
Any change in state policy is for the legislature. 155 
John W. Davis, on the other hand, while perhaps regarding the 
case "as a strictly legal matter"156 and while arguing effectively that 
the history of the fourteenth amendment supported separate-but-equal 
segregated schools, 157 became "emotionally overwrought."158 Davis 
152. Id. at 64. 
153. Id. at 67. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 319 (emphasis added). 
156. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 673 (quoting Robert Figg, the state's lawyer at the trial 
of Briggs). 
157. Id. at 671; ARGUMENT, supra note 119, at 207-14. 
158. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 672. Earl Warren's memoirs are a little confusing on 
this point. He wrote, while discussing the 1955 arguments: 
The arguments, for me at least, took a strange course. One might expect, as I did, that the 
lawyers representing black school children would appeal to the emotions of the Court based 
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effectively evoked empathy for whites by using a counterimage of 295 
white children in Clarendon County being overwhelmed in the class-
room by the nearly 2800 black children.159 He made an indirect ap-
peal to racial prejudice by mentioning miscegenation statutes,16° and 
stated ominously that "the result [of a desegregation order] would not 
be pleasing."161 He argued that the state "is convinced that the happi-
ness, the progress and the welfare of these children is best promoted in 
segregated schools"162 and invoked a fable in saying, "Here is equal 
education, not promised, not prophesied, but present. Shall it be 
thrown away on some fancied question of racial prestige?"163 
Marshall retorted: 
This [argument] that Mr. Davis and Mr. Moore both relied on, these 
horrible census figures, the horrible number of Negroes in the South -
and I thought at some stage it would be recognized by them that it shows 
that in truth and in fact in this country ... two-thirds of the Negroes are 
compelled to submit to segregation.164 
* * * * 
I understand them to say that it is just a little feeling on the part of 
Negroes, they don't like segregation. As Mr. Davis said yesterday, the 
only thing ... the Negro has been trying to get [is] what was recognized 
in Strauder v. West Virginia, which is the same status as anybody else 
regardless of race.165 
* * * * 
There is no way you can repay lost school years.166 
In response to the historical argument that Congress had approved 
upon their many years of oppression, and that the states would hold to strictly legal matters. 
More nearly the opposite developed. Thurgood Marshall made no emotional appeal, and 
argued the legal issues in a rational manner as cold as steel. On the other hand, states' 
attorney Davis, a great advocate and orator, .•. displayed a great deal of emotion, and on 
more than one occasion broke down and took a few moments to compose himself. 
E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 287 (1977). But Davis did not argue in 1955, 
and one could hardly characterize Marshall's 1953 arguments on rebuttal as unemotional, 
although the transcript of his 1955 argument does appear "unemotional" based on his words. 
One can only assume Warren partially confused the two sets of arguments in his memoirs, hardly 
a surprising mistake given his many years on the bench and the 24 years that had passed. Part of 
Davis' emotionalism in 1953, moreover, may be attributable to the fact that it was the last argu-
ment he made in the Supreme Court. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 672. 
159. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 672; ARGUMENT, supra note 119, at 215. 
160. ARGUMENT, supra note 119, at 216. That the almost Freudian sexual phobia about 
blacks marrying white women was and is part of American racial prejudice goes without saying; 
the Court itself did not strike down miscegenation laws until 1967 in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1 (1967). 
161. ARGUMENT, supra note 119, at 216. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. Davis recounted Aesop's fable of the dog who lost his meat while attempting to 
seize its reflection in a stream. 
164. Id. at 234. 
165. Id. at 237. 
166. Id. at 238. 
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of school segregation in enacting the fourteenth amendment and had 
continued to do so, Marshall stated: "And I think it makes no pro-
gress for us to find out who made what argument." 167 He started to 
condemn the "little pet feelings of race, little pet feelings of custom," 
and then, finding his voice, he described racism's irrationality and 
meaning: 
I got the feeling on hearing the discussion yesterday that when you put a 
white child in a school with a whole lot of colored children, the child 
would fall apart or something. Everybody knows that is not true .... 
There is some magic to it. You can have them voting together, you 
can have them not restricted because of law in the houses they live in. 
You can have them going to the same state university and the same col-
lege, but if they go to elementary and high school, the world will fall 
apart .... 
They can't take race out of this case . . . . 
We charge [the school segregation statutes] are Black Codes .... 
. . . [W]e submit the only way to arrive at [a decision affirming segre-
gation] is to find that for some reason Negroes are inferior to all other 
human beings. 
The only [conceivable reason for segregation] is an inherent determi-
nation that the people who were formerly in slavery, regardless of any-
thing else, shall be kept as near that stage as is possible, and now is the 
time, we submit, that this Court should make it clear that that is not 
what our Constitution stands for.168 
The argument that Marshall made in 1955 did not overcome the 
problems posed by a white-dominated society and Justices reluctant to 
go farther in their role than they had in Brown I, but it reemphasized 
the narrative. Against the "gradualism" the Court eventually 
adopted, Marshall pointed directly to the damage a "wait and see" 
attitude would cause: 
We believe we are entitled to our rights as of the next school tetm, and if 
we cannot get that type of decree in the judgment of this Court, then 
what is going to happen? 
... It is important to start that immediately ... and to end it at a 
date certain. Otherwise, we will have . . . throughout the country the 
continuation of what bas been branded . . . by this Court as 
unconstitutional. 
In my county they say my child will go to school, schools will be 
desegregated in five years. I move over into the next county, hoping that 
he will go in one year and they make it six years. I will be traveling all 
167. Id. at 239. 
168. Id. at 23940. 
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around the country trying to get my constitutional rights. 169 
As he had in 1952 and 1953, Marshall pointed to the incoherence of 
segregation and racism: 
In Virginia, it is interesting to me that the very people ... that would 
object to sending their white children to school with Negroes, are eating 
food that has been prepared, served and almost put in their mouths by 
the mothers of those children, and they do it day in and day out, but 
they cannot have the child go to school. 170 
In Brown and its companion cases, the Court was directly facing 
the Other, who was telling his own story: all but one of the lawyers 
arguing for ending segregation 'were black.171 Thurgood Marshall, 
who had participated in fifteen cases before the Court, 172 often de-
parted from the usual forms of oral argument to "testify" as a black 
and to include his own observations of segregation in the South. He 
humanized the story, using specific examples and illustrations, and he 
expressed moral outrage as well: "We charge that these are Black 
Codes." The Other was in Court, and he was telling the Justices what 
it was like to be the Other. The Court heard from the very humans it 
would have to rule for or against. Whether this affected the Justices 
would be hard, if not impossible, to know; Justice Burton in 1952 ap-
pears to have considered it relevant to note "beside the name of each 
NAACP lawyer in Brown" the word "colored."173 
According to Kluger, the Justices who could be said to have been 
most dedicated to the ideology of legality and the Rule of Law, Jack-
son and Frankfurter, had the most trouble reconciling any empathic 
response with their perceived roles in deciding Brown L 174 Justice 
Jackson, fully aware of the horrible effects of racial prejudice from his 
experience as chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials, 175 indicated 
that "[h]e did not doubt that segregation was painful to Negroes."176 
But he rejected the narrative presented by the NAACP lawyers as "so-
ciological" and believed that the Court could not incorporate into law 
"these elusive psychological and subjective factors." 177 Jackson con-
169. Id. at 439. 
170. Id. at 437. 
171. The exception was Jack Greenberg, who argued Gebhart v. Belton, 33 Del. Ch. 144, 91 
A.2d 137 (1952), ajfd., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the Delaware case, in 1952 and shared the argument 
with Marshall in 1953. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 438, 581, 677-78. 
172. Id. at 561. 
173. Id. at 611. 
174. Id. at 596-98, 601, 603, 610, 681. 
175. Id. at 603, 690. 
176. Id. at 689. 
177. Id. at 609, 689-90. 
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sidered the matter "political," not legal,I78 despite the blunt fact that 
law was heavily implicated in the perpetuation of segregation. On the 
other hand, "[a]s a political decision, he could go along with" striking 
down segregation. I 79 
During the arguments in Brown, Justice Frankfurter manifested 
some discomfort with and resistance to the narrative presented. At 
one point in 1952 he stated that the testimony in the trial courts about 
the harmful effects of segregation was "irrelevant" to the question of 
the remedy. Iso At another point, however, Frankfurter manifested 
concern with reconciling the narrative with legality (and, one may as-
sume, cultural reality), by noting that "nothing would be worse than 
for this Court ... to make an abstract declaration that segregation is 
bad and then have it evaded by tricks."IBI A Justice who could be said 
to have "worshipped the law" and legality, I82 he also had been advi-
sory counsel to the NAACPI83 and was a member of a group subjected 
to the worst forms of racism, prejudice, and torture throughout his-
tory: he was a Jew who had tried to assimilate and who had only 
partially succeeded.184 The pain of the experience of being Jewish 
could not help but resonate even if only slightly to the pain of another 
oppressed minority. 
Frankfurter typically struggled to deny his "merely personal 
views" condemning racism while at the same time recognizing that 
"writ[ing] into the Constitution a belief in the Negro's natural inferi-
ority or [a] personal belief in the desirability of segregat[ion]" was 
equally repugnant. I85 He very much wanted to strike down the school 
segregation statutes but ultimately found little help in the forms of 
legality in which he strongly believed. The history of the fourteenth 
amendment gave him no help. His commitment to separating the 
power of the federal government from that of state governments and 
his belief that the Court, as an unrepresentative decisionmaking body 
in a democracy, had very little power to change the law created seem-
178. Id. at 689. 
179. Id. at 681. 
180. ARGUMENT, supra note 119, at 63-64. Frankfurter questioned or interrupted Marshall 
46 times, while asking John W. Davis only seven questions. 
181. Id. at 48. 
182. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 596. 
183. Id. at 597, 599. 
184. H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 19, 22-23,passim (1981). Ironi-
cally, Frankfurter despised John W. Davis, counsel for the State of South Carolina in Briggs, in 
part because Davis' Wall Street practice and WASP credentials undoubtedly stung. Id. at 76-77, 
81, 94-95. 
185. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 684. 
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ingly insurmountable obstacles to striking down school segregation.186 
A memo written by Frankfurter indicates, however, that he finally 
concluded that "[l]aw must respond to transformation of views as well 
as to that of outward circumstances"; this declaration served as a justi-
fication for striking down segregation because "[t]he effect of changes 
in men'sfeelings for what is right and just" was "relevant in determin-
ing whether a discrimination denies the equal protection of the 
laws."187 
Frankfurter may have empathized with blacks, but the explanation 
may also lie elsewhere: One of Frankfurter's biographers has noted 
that, because of Frankfurter's own experience, public education had 
utmost value for him. 188 In a footnote, Hirsch observed that "[a] frag-
ment among his files suggests that the personal value [he] attached to 
the importance of public schools as a means of integration into Ameri-
can society contributed significantly to his willingness to agree with 
the Court's revolutionary decision" in Brown. 189 The fragment noted: 
"If the negro is to make his due contribution . . . he must have the 
knowledge, the training and the skill which only good schools can 
vouchsafe."190 Hirsch concluded that the words "'good schools' ... 
helped trigger in Frankfurter a willingness to ignore judicial self-re-
straint .... " 191 
Other Justices seemed to have had little trouble accepting the nar-
rative, drawing on their own experiences and perhaps on imaginative 
placement of self in the black's shoes. According to K.luger, Justice 
Black, a native of Alabama who had briefly belonged to the Klan, "did 
not need scholars or philosophers to tell him what the purpose of seg-
regation was." 192 Having lived in the South, Black knew "[i]ts pur-
pose ... was to discriminate against Negroes in the belief that they 
were inferior beings .... " 193 Justice Minton thought that although 
186. Id. at 599-602, 653-55, 683-85. 
187. Id. at 685 (emphasis added). 
188. H.N. HIRSCH, supra note 184, at 195-96. 
189. Id. at 195 n.*. 
190. Id. The fragment reproduced by Hirsch is a handwritten note by Frankfurter quoting 
an unidentified piece from the Atlanta Journal. The note is found in the Felix Frankfurter pa-
pers, Harvard Law School Library, at box 3, folder 34. 
191. Id. 
192. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 592-93. 
193. Id. at 593. In fact, Black not only knew what segregation meant for blacks, he also 
knew the likely effect of reversing Plessy. Philip Elman at the Justice Department had heard that 
Black was saying "The guys who talked nigger would be in charge, there would be riots, the 
Army might have to be called out - he was scaring the shit out of the Justices, especially 
Frankfurter and Jackson .... But Hugo was determined to overrule [Plessy] on principle." Id. 
at 594. Of course, Black's assessment of southern reaction (and, one might add, later northern 
reaction) was all too accurate. 
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Plessy had given segregation an "aura of legitimacy," it was unconsti-
tutional;194 all that could support racial separation was a belief in 
black inferiority, 195 and this was a message that he was not willing to 
accept. 
Chief Justice Warren, who as Attorney General of California had 
indulged in racism against Americans of Japanese descent by playing 
an instrumental role in the internment of Japanese Californians,196 
had no doubt that segregation existed simply to perpetuate "a belief in 
the inferiority of the Negro."197 "On the merits, the natural, the logi-
cal, and practically the only way the case could be decided was clear. 
The question was how the decision was to be reached."198 Empathy 
probably did play a role in Warren's decision to strike down school 
segregation laws, for the Chief Justice was frequently to decide cases 
by "putting himself 'in the other's shoes' ... to 'get to the essence of 
the case.' " 199 Apparently, Warren was not especially concerned 
about the obstacles presented by legality, whether characterized by ap-
parent congressional approval of segregation, the attitudes and laws of 
the South, or the long existence of the doctrine of Plessy and its prog-
eny. Instead, to Warren, "the injustice of an enforced separation of 
human beings based on their color was apparent.''200 In the Court's 
first conference after the 1953 arguments, Warren implied that the de-
fenders of Plessy were white supremacists; he used "the argument to 
induce shame" to persuade the Justices to support striking down 
school segregation.201 
Reed appears to have been the only Justice who failed to be 
touched by the story of pain caused by segregation: "He did not ac-
cept the position that segregation was necessarily an act of discrimina-
tion ... .''202 Reed had written the opinions in Smith v. Allwright 203 
194. Id. at 613. 
195. Id. at 682. 
196. See E. WARREN, supra note 158, at 145-50; see also G.E. WHITE, EARL WARREN: A 
PUBLIC LIFE 68-75, 161-62 (1982) (describing Warren's personal bias against Japanese as well as 
his personal responsibility for the internment camps). 
197. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 680. G.E. WHITE, supra note 196, at 162, indicates 
Warren had made strong public statements for civil rights for blacks and had encouraged antidis-
crimination legislation for blacks when he was Attorney General, although he was not entirely 
free of racist sentiments. 
198. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 678 (emphasis in original) (quoting interview with Chief 
Justice Warren). 
199. G.E. WHITE, supra note 196, at 228. 
200. Id. at 163; R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 679-80. 
201. G.E. WHITE, supra note 196, at 165; R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 680. 
202. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 595. 
203. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
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and Morgan v. Virginia, 204 important decisions invalidating whites-
only primary elections and segregation on interstate buses, respec-
tively. But he was "an austere and very proper Southern gen-
tleman."205 He had had difficulty with a case holding segregated 
restaurants in the District of Columbia unlawful, because he did not 
like the notion that "a nigra [sic] can walk into the restaurant at the 
Mayflower Hotel and sit down . . . right next to Mrs. Reed. "206 In 
1952, he apparently took the position that "separation of races is for 
benefit of both."207 In 1953, after Warren's veiled moral challenge, 
Reed replied that "[n]o one had suggested ... that segregation was 
permissible because the Negro belonged to an inferior race," although 
he offered no other justification for continuing segregation.208 One 
could argue that Reed failed to empathize with blacks but did em-
pathize with white southerners; he could imagine Mrs. Reed's discom-
fort at having a black sitting next to her in a restaurant but couldn't 
imagine the discomfort caused the black by being excluded. At best, 
he engaged in unreflective empathy, empathizing with those like him; 
at worst, he was guilty of a racial prejudice that blocked his ability to 
hear the NAACP narrative and empathize with blacks. Racial stereo-
typy and prejudice seem to have rendered him deaf to the message of 
pain and stigma so powerfully presented in Brown. 209 Reed was finally 
swayed by Warren with appeals to his conscience about the effect of a 
dissent.210 
All three types of empathy seem to have been present in Brown L· 
Feeling the distress of the blacks, understanding the painful situation 
created by segregation, and responding to the cry of pain by action: 
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'sepa-
rate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inher-
ently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly 
situated . . . are ... deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment.211 
The narrative was one of the pain of segregation, the legal framework 
was the equal protection clause, the action was the de facto overruling 
of Plessy. 
The Brown II decision seems in many ways to have been such a 
204. 328 U.S. 373 (1946). 
205. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 595. 
206. Id. The case was District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953). 
207. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 596 (quoting Justice Burton's'notes). 
208. Id. at 680. 
209. See id. at 683 (after the 1953 arguments, Reed was still fixed on upholding segregation). 
210. Id. at 698. 
211. 347 U.S. at 495. 
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substantial retreat from Brown I that it may render Brown I less a 
triumph of empathy than I assert. Yet Brown I remains a powerful 
example of the ability of Supreme Court Justices to hear a different 
and affecting narrative; to see the world in a new way and to under-
stand the pain created by law in that world; and to respond to that 
pain. Unlike Herbert Wechsler, who declared in a law review article 
that Charles Houston "did not suffer more than I in knowing we had 
to go to Union Station to lunch together during the recess,, of 
Supreme Court arguments because of segregation in the District of 
Columbia,212 the Justices saw that a Charles Houston did suffer more. 
The pain caused by racism, the discrimination against blacks because 
they were black, the privilege whiteness gives in life, did reach the 
Justices. Wechsler missed altogether the point he could have lunch 
anywhere he chose, but Houston could not. In a variation of blaming 
the victim (segregation of blacks stamps them with a badge of inferi-
ority because they choose to construe it that way; enforced separation 
of the sexes is not necessarily discriminatory "against females merely 
because it may be the females who resent it and it is imposed by judg-
ments predominantly male"213) Wechsler manifested a total lack of 
empathy - in addition to reiterating the logic of Plessy. 
In contrast to the type of critique used by Herbert Wechsler, which 
could be said to manifest the worst use of legality to abstract human 
reality out of existence, is the defense of Brown by another legal 
scholar, Charles Black.214 (Unfortunately, Black's defense of the de-
segregation decisions never gained the respect paid Wechsler's article 
by the established legal community.) Against legality, Black - a 
southern white who assisted the NAACP in briefing its reply to the 
questions used by the Court for reargument in 1953 - could be said to 
have argued for empathic understanding.215 Making the "subjectively 
212. Wechsler, supra note 110, at 34. 
213. Id. at 33. 
214. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). 
215. The article is rich with description of the meaning of segregation to black and white 
southerners, the formal and informal structures that result in "a whole race of people find[ing] 
itself confined within a system which is set up and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in 
an inferior situation," id. at 424, and the intentional harm inflicted on human beings who happen 
to be black. Black's contribution to the brief for the reargument in 1953 included an insistence 
that the decree in the case not be one.mandating "gradual" desegregation. R. KLUGER, supra 
note 107, at 645. And he added language that emphasized the damage segregation inflicts: 
These infant appellants are asserting the most important secular claims that can be put 
forward by children, the claim to their full measure of the chance to learn and grow, and the 
inseparably connected but even more important claim to be treated as entire citizens of the 
society into which they have been born. 
Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2 & 4 and for Respondents in No. 10 on Reargument at 191, 
Brown v. Board of Educ. (No. 1), Briggs v. Elliot (No. 2), Davis v. County School Bd. (No. 4), 
Gebhart v. Belton (No. 10), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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obvious" point that segregation was meant to perpetuate the inferior 
position ofblacks,216 Black also drew on the history and culture of the 
South to state that any claim of "equality" in law was laughable: 
"Then we are solemnly told that segregation is not intended to harm 
the segregated race, or to stamp it with the mark of inferiority. How 
long must we keep a straight face?"217 The evidence was "very clear" 
about what "segregation means to the people who impose it and to the 
people who are subjected to it."218 Criticisms of the Court via legality, 
Black contended, simply stood for the lack of 
[a] ritually sanctioned way in which the Court, as a Court, can permissi-
bly learn what is obvious to everybody else and to the Justices as individ-
uals. But surely, confronted with such a problem, legal acumen has only 
one proper task - that of developing ways to make it permissible for the 
Court to use what it knows; any other counsel is of despair. 219 
After Brown I, however, the Justices were out on a limb. "The 
white-supremacists of the South were swift and shrill in their out-
cry. "220 The Governor of Virginia declared, "I shall use every legal 
means at my command to continue segregated schools in Virginia."221 
The Eisenhower administration remained mute in the face of public 
outcry.222 Brown I, by postponing the issue of remedy, increased the 
opportunity for second thoughts: Almost a year passed between the 
decision of May 17, 1954, and the arguments of April 11, 1955, a year 
in which Southern resistance, congressional criticism, and executive 
inaction may have reminded the Justices to stick to "legality." 
B. Making the Empathic Point for Poor People: 
Shapiro v. Thompson 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 223 arguably is "just" the "right to travel" 
case. Certainly the more expansive hope that it would institute a doc-
trine of special protection for the poor was dashed in subsequent 
cases.224 Yet it provides an excellent example of the interweaving of 
216. Black, supra note 214, at 424. 
217. Id. at 425. 
218. Id. at 426 (emphasis added). 
219. Id. at 427-28 (emphasis added). 
220. R. KLUGER, supra note 107, at 710. 
221. Id. at 714. And tragically the battle goes on in Topeka and everywhere else. J.A. 
LUKAS, COMMON GROUND (1985); Robbins, Historic Case on Rights is Reopened in Topeka, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1986, at 104, col. 1. 
222. E. WARREN, supra note 158, at 289. 
223. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
224. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 
(1972); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1 (1973). 
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empathic strategies and legal principles by Archibald Cox.225 Not in-
volved in the first round of briefing and argument, Cox and Howard 
Lesnick entered the case when the Court set the matter for 
reargument. 226 
In terms of the existing law and legal ideology, the original plain-
tiffs in Shapiro had to lose. As in Brown, Congress and state legisla-
tures had spoken; unlike Brown, there was no issue of explicit racial 
categorization. Choices about how to spend money were legislative, 
not judicial. And attempts to fit the claim that one-year residency re-
quirements for welfare eligibility were unconstitutional into existing 
doctrine were strained. Unless the Court declared classifications based 
on wealth suspect, there was little doctrine or precedent to support 
striking down residency requirements.227 Indeed, the State of Con-
necticut's brief in the case was smug, because the legal issues were so 
obviously settled. 228 The amicus briefs filed by other states were less 
smug in tone, yet they made full use of the doctrines and beliefs about 
legal structure to tell the Court, essentially, that it had no reason to get 
involved. Spending was a legislative matter. The states and Congress 
were doing their best with limited funds;229 the one-year requirement 
was necessary to protect the funds for longer-term residents of the 
states,230 to enable legislatures to budget money,231 and to prevent op-
portunism and fraud. 232 
The states all conceded a constitutional right to travel from state to 
state, and either denied that the residency requirement infringed that 
right233 or asserted that no right to "subsidized" travel existed.234 A 
225. "Justice Stewart for one, was strongly influenced by the Cox argument." B. 
SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 387 (1985). 
226. Shapiro v. Thompson, 392 U.S. 920 (1968). 
227. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630 n.8, discussed the various doctrinal precedents and themes that 
had been developed up to the time of the Court's decision. 
228. The original Connecticut brief was only 18 pages Jong; it contained a "we dare you" 
argument: 
It would seem to be an exercise in judicial arrogance to hold that [the Connecticut statute] is 
unconstitutional. In effect the Court would be saying that it is much more competent to say 
what constitutes public welfare and what is justice than the members of the legislatures of 40 
states who passed these laws ..• , the governors of the 40 states who sign these bills into law, 
and the Congress ... who have expressly recognized the problem and agreed that residency 
requirements are fair and equitable ... and the President who signed the bill into law. 
Brief for Appellant at 9, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (No. 813). The brief dis-
missed the opinion of the district court finding for Thompson, stating that "one looks in vain to 
find a single case cited by them that could reasonably have upheld their decision." Id. at 11. 
229. Id. at 17; Brieffor California as Amicus Curiae at 5-7; Brieffor Iowa as Amicus Curiae 
at 2. 
230. Brief for Iowa at 2; Brief for Appellant at 17-18. 
231. Brief for California at 5-6; Brief for Iowa at 2. 
232. Brieffor Iowa at 4; Brief for Delaware as Amicus Curiae at 4; Brief for Appellant at JO, 
233. Brief for Appellant at 13-14; Brief for California at 10; Brief for Iowa at 10. 
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story of starving people would not have helped the states, so they ex-
ploited stories supportive of stereotypes and prejudices regarding the 
"undeserving poor." Thus, in its brief the State of Connecticut did all 
it could to portray Vivian Thompson, the original plaintiff, as a stere-
otypical welfare parasite. Thompson was "[a] 19 year old unwed 
mother of a minor child" who "was pregnant and later gave birth to 
another child."235 "There is nothing in the record ... to show that 
either the appellee or her children suffered from poor health or had 
any other special problem ... which kept her out of the labor mar-
ket."236 Moreover, the brief and counsel for Connecticut at the first 
oral argument strongly implied Thompson had moved to the state sim-
ply to take advantage of its "generous" benefits.237 Rather than estab-
lishing a claim that Connecticut harshly allowed women and children 
to starve, Thompson's "[r]eal claim ... is that Connecticut discrimi-
nates against a poor applicant who has no desire to enter the labor 
market .... "238 
The initial briefs filed for the persons denied welfare, as well as the 
argument for the named appellee, Thompson, were legally weak and 
failed to present a concrete picture of the persons affected that could 
rebut the stereotypical portraits painted by the states. The brief on 
behalf of Thompson did make her a more sympathetic figure than the 
state had claimed - she had moved to Connecticut to be with her 
mother, a Connecticut resident for eight years, but her mother ulti-
mately was unable to support her.239 Her pregnancy made her unable 
to work or get job training. She and her two children subsisted on the 
$31.60 a week contributed by Catholic Family Services after she was 
denied AFDC by the state. But then she disappeared from the brief, 
which continued in the most general terms to a description of poverty 
in America and general legal arguments. 240 
It was not until reargument that the human issue - that poor peo-
ple who moved to a new state could very well starve for a year -
became clear.241 In the Supplemental Brief for Appellees on Reargu-
234. Brief for California at 11-12; Transcript of Oral Argument, in 68 LANDMARK BRIEFS 
AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME CoURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
331-32 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS]. 
235. Brief for Appellant at 2-3. 
236. Id. at 5. 
237. Id.; Transcript of Oral Argument, 68 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 234, at 332. 
238. Brief for Appellant at 5. 
239. Brief for Appellee at 2. 
240. Id. at 3; Transcript of Oral Argument, 68 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 234, at 343. 
241. See Brieffor Appellee at 4-9 (description of poverty in America). The legal arguments 
asserted that, although there was disagreement as to the exact textual source of the right to 
travel, "[i]t is now recognized without dissent that the right to travel from one State to another is 
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ment, the Summary of Argument made the Cox-Lesnick strategy 
apparent: 
Abstractly stated, therefore, the question presented by all three cases is 
whether this discrimination [in AFDC benefits] on the basis of length of 
residence in a State violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
But this abstract statement conceals the flesh, blood and heart of the 
true questions. The facts of these cases make three points clear that 
frame - and limit - the constitutional issue. 242 
. Just as the abolitionist lawyers stressed the persons affected by the 
fugitive slave laws,243 Cox and Lesnick in the brief and Cox at oral 
argument returned again and again to the individuals involved. Cox's 
argument used their names and their stories to make his points. The 
plaintiffs were "going back home";244 "they are mothers of dependent 
children without present husbands who moved into the new jurisdic-
tion either to go back home ... , or rejoin their families, or to get help 
from some person, or perhaps to get a job; and then who are left abso-
lutely destitute when misfortune occurs."245 With the one-year resi-
dency requirement for eligibility, a woman who left Pennsylvania to 
help aging grandparents and was absent a few years before returning 
to Pennsylvania was denied AFDC;246 Vera Barley, a woman commit-
ted to St. Elizabeth's Hospital in the District of Columbia for "20-odd 
years" and who became competent to be released had not been a "resi-
dent" for one year in the District of Columbia and was forced to re-
main in the hospital.247 Families not eligible for AFDC would be 
separated: In the case of Juanita Smith, who had virtually grown up 
in Pennsylvania and who had returned home from Delaware after an 
absence of "a few years," the residency requirement left her with the 
alternative of going back to Delaware or losing custody of her chil-
dren: "Well ... we'll take your children away from you and provide 
institutional care which might run anywhere from six months to two 
years. And this, at least, will provide them with shelter."248 
Cox, having set a descriptive stage of the personal realities of those 
a fundamental right." Id. at 10. The Connecticut statute interfered with the right of indigent 
individuals to travel to Connecticut, id. at 11, and the "right to establish residence" in the state. 
Id. at 19. And, "[a]s to those persons who choose to remain in Connecticut [despite their ineligi· 
bility for AFDC, the statute] in effect makes the right to enjoy residence meaningless because it 
forces on them a life devoid of any humane quality." Id. at 20. 
242. Supplemental Brief for Appellees on Reargument at 3 (emphasis added). 
243. R. COVER, supra note 91, at 216. 
244. Transcript of Reargument, in 68 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 234, at 382. 
245. Id. at 383. 
246. Supplemental Brief for Appellees on Reargument at 29. 
247. Transcript of Reargument, in 68 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 234, at 384. 
248. Id. at 382. 
June 1987] Legality and Empathy 1613 
denied benefits solely by virtue of failing to meet a one-year residency 
requirement then tied the narrative to the legal arguments: 
First, ... the one-year residence requirement discriminates in relation to 
the fundamental necessities of life between two classes of persons who 
are identically situated in terms of need . . . or any other thing of that 
kind save how long they've been there or where they came from. 
Second, the sole basis of classification is the differentiation between 
new and old residents. . . . [T]hat discrimination against newcomers, 
against those who Mrs. Williams [counsel for Iowa] said during her oral 
argument "are not our people" ... reveals that this sort of thing rests on 
prejudice against outsiders. It's invidious in that sense .... But it also 
penalizes the exercise of a ... liberty, a freedom, an aspect of freedom 
which has long constitutional recognition. 
And then the third element is that the classification ... has no sub-
stantial relation to the accomplishment of any permissible state 
policy .... 
. . . I'm suggesting that this isn't a discrimination like one between a 
business that may claim it's entitled to a subsidy for $5 million, and that 
it's unfair as compared to another business getting a subsidy of $20 mil-
lion. This is something that operates in relation to not only the rudi-
ments of existence ... , but in relation to such things as keeping families 
together. The answer to Juanita Smith was: "The only thing we can do 
is put your children in institutional care." In relation to Vera Barley, the 
discrimination operated, literally, in relation to human liberties.249 
Later in the argument he stated, "I think that I have sought to stress 
the right to live where you please as a basic right. . . . Your Honors 
emphasized a point I should have made more sharply, perhaps. Our 
case deals with the right to live where you please to seek better 
opportunities. "250 
What is difficult to capture is the total ease with which Cox wove 
the individual stories into the legal arguments; to break out one or the 
other fails to convey the manner in which he made the stories and the 
legal points one. For example, in rebutting the state's proferred justifi-
cations for the rationality of the residency requirements, he observed: 
The additional point that I would make is that while I think no discrimi-
nation can be justified on the assumption that the higher relief payment 
operates as a magnet . . . I do suggest to the Court that even if it be 
assumed that a state might deal with this problem in an appropriate way, 
that this way of dealing with it is unconstitutional .... I point out that 
it's excessively broad in a number of respects. 
First, the one-year residency requirement applies even to people ... 
who come from states with higher or equal benefit levels .... 
Second, it applies to people who come for reasons that demonstrably 
249. Id. at 387-88 (emphasis on tape recording of reargument). 
250. Id. at 397 (emphasis added). 
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are unrelated to the benefit level; and the/acts of these cases are the best 
evidence of that. Five out of seven were coming back to where they'd lived 
before. Another five out of seven were coming to join families. And of 
course most people move for hoped-for jobs.251 
Against these narratives, skillfully and at times movingly spoken, 
interwoven with cases and legal doctrines, the legalistic arguments of 
counsel for the states and the District of Columbia appeared to be 
unresponsive. More "emotional" appeals, which might better be char-
acterized as appeals to stereotyped beliefs about the poor, also seemed 
unresponsive to the narrative Cox used. Iowa as amicus claimed that 
the need to "know, within one year, who wants to contribute, who are 
our people, who wants to live here and contribute, and [who] we want 
to help,"252 justified the one-year requirement. Connecticut argued 
that "an adverse decision by this Court would have the effect of penal-
izing every liberal welfare benefit state, by putting a premium on the 
poor benefit states to encourage their needy and dependent to migrate 
to greener pastures,"253 and claimed that its welfare rolls already had 
been "skyrocketing."254 Counsel for the District of Columbia argued 
that the residency requirement was a "mere discouragement" to the 
right to travel. 255 The states and the District of Columbia also 
stressed that, because of limited funding, budget increases or cuts in 
grants to all recipients would be necessary - implying that a decision 
to find for Thompson would cause greater hardship for the poor.256 
To negate the apparent harshness of the rule, counsel for Pennsylvania 
stated with confidence that the purpose of the law was "of course, to 
encourage self-respect, self-dependency, and the desire to motivate the 
individual to be a good and useful citizen in society. It is to encourage 
him [sic] to go to work .... "257 Counsel for Iowa began her argument 
251. Id. at 405 (emphasis on tape recording of reargument; wording conforms to tape rather 
than transcript). 
252. Id. at 363. 
253. Id. at 356. 
254. Id. at 358. 
255. Id. at 371. 
256. Id. at 358-59 (counsel for Connecticut); id. at 367 (counsel for the District of 
Columbia). 
257. Id. at 408. Counsel had to retract this claim about legislative purpose when questioned 
at the end of his argument: 
The Court: Could I ask you - I still don't understand. Do I properly understand that 
you've suggested that this statute ... rests its justification on the desire to encourage people 
to work, rather than to save money? 
Mr. Sennett: I think it rests on both grounds ..•. [W]e have spelled out that one of the 
legitimate purposes of the Pennsylvania statute is a budgetary requirement; that limited 
resources are available and that these [can] only be distributed in a certain way and that that 
is a legitimate purpose; and that ... in order for us to determine how much money is going 
to be available for welfare, [that] is also a legitimate purpose. 
Id. at 414 (words in brackets based on tape recording of reargument, not transcript). 
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by acknowledging there was a problem but stated essentially "this is 
not the forum" for making the decision. "And again they point out 
that there is a 'need' - and we are all aware that there is a need for 
people who are suffering, and are in want in our country- but this is 
not sufficient reason" to overlook the law.258 "It is a legislative prob-
lem, and not a judicial problem."259 
Some members of the Court appeared during oral argument to 
hold stereotyped beliefs or concerns about poor people (and probably 
worse, about that creature, the Welfare Mother). Justice Black appar-
ently assumed that spending six months in Massachusetts and six 
months in Florida is "a very common thing" and "doubt[ ed]" Cox's 
assertion that it was not common "in relation to the types of people 
we're talking about here."26° Chief Justice Warren was very concerned 
with the figures for AFDC migrants to California, "some of the West-
ern states and Florida."261 He sharply disputed Cox's assertion that 
the places most affected were New York City and the District of Co-
lumbia based on the fact that the "flow of migration of the people who 
end up with ADC care is, for the most part, from the rural areas and 
very largely from the South .... "262 The Chief Justice pushed for 
information about increases for "states like California, Arizona, and 
Florida"263 from Cox, who finally offered to prepare a memo on the 
subject. 
On the other hand, other members of the Court sharply disputed 
the government lawyers' claims. One Justice skeptically engaged 
counsel for Connecticut: "And my other question is: Do you think 
they can just not eat for a year?" And: "You want to convince me 
that Connecticut is one of the few states in the Union that has no 
unemployment?"264 
The majority opinion itself could have been written only by a 
Court that heard the stories the indigent persons had presented -
indeed, it reads like Cox and Lesnick's brief and Cox's oral argument. 
It begins with stories of the individuals: 
[A]ppellee Vivian Marie Thompson ... was a 19-year-old unwed mother 
258. Id. at 362. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. at 394. 
261. Id. at 400. 
262. Id. at 401. 
263. Id. at 403. 
264. Id. at 360, 361. A Justice also asked Counsel for the District of Columbia during his 
argument if he wanted the Court "to note that this Government is unable to pay people enough 
money so they can eat?" Id. at 368. I could not ascertain from the tapes - nor do the tran-
scripts indicate - which Justice(s) asked these questions. 
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... [who had moved to Connecticut] to live with her mother .... Be-
cause of her pregnancy, she was unable to work or enter a work training 
program .... " 
Appellee Minnie Harrel, now deceased, had moved with her three 
children from New York to Washington .... She suffered from cancer 
and moved to be near members of her family who lived in Washington. 
Appellee Barley ... returned to the District in March 1941 and was 
committed a month later to St. Elizabeth's Hospital as mentally ill .... 
She was deemed eligible for release in 1965, and a plan was made to 
transfer her . . . . The plan depended, however, upon Mrs. Barley's ob-
taining welfare assistance . . . . Her application ... was denied because 
her time spent in the hospital did not count in determining compliance 
with the one-year requirement. 
Appellee Brown lived with her mother and two of her three children 
in Fort Smith, Arkansas. Her third child was living with ... Brown's 
father in the District of Columbia. When her mother moved . . . to 
Oklahoma, appellee Brown ... returned to the District of Columbia 
where she had lived as a child. Her application for AFDC . . . was 
approved insofar as it sought assistance for the child who had lived in 
the District with her father but was denied . . . for the other two 
children. 265 
The story for the other D.C. appellee was similar. The Pennsylvania 
mothers both had spent much of their lives in Pennsylvania: Appellee 
Smith had returned with her five children and lived with her father 
until he lost his job. Appellee Foster had gone to South Carolina for 
approximately two years "to care for her grandfather and invalid 
grandmother and had returned to Pennsylvania."266 Each of the ap-
pellees, the Court noted, had "met the test for residence in their juris-
dictions, as well as all other eligibility requirements except [the one-
year residence requirement]."267 
The opinion by Justice Brennan continued: "There is weighty evi-
dence that exclusion from the jurisdiction of the poor who need or 
may need relief was the specific objective of these provisions";268 "the 
purpose of deterring the in-migration of indigents cannot serve as a 
justification . . . , since that purpose is constitutionally impermissi-
ble";269 and "none of the statutes [was] tailored to serve [the] objec-
tive" of discouraging "those indigents who would enter the State 
solely to obtain larger benefits."270 The implication that the poor were 
265. 394 U.S. at 623-25. 
266. 394 U.S. at 625-26. 
267. 394 U.S. at 627. 
268. 394 U.S. at 628. 
269. 394 U.S. at 631. 
270. 394 U.S. at 631. 
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somehow less deserving was wrong: "Surely such a mother is no less 
deserving than a mother who moves into a particular State in order to 
take advantage of its better educational facilities."271 The "contribu-
tion to the community" argument failed as well: 
We have difficulty seeing how long-term residents who qualify for wel-
fare are making a greater present contribution to the State in taxes than 
indigent[s] ... who have recently arrived .... [T]here is some question, 
as a factual matter, whether this argument is applicable in Pennsylvania 
where the record suggests that some 40% of those denied . . . had 
lengthy prior residence in the State .... [This] would logically permit the 
State to bar new residents from schools, parks, and libraries or deprive 
them of police and fire protection. 272 
The majority opinion walked a fine doctrinal line, relying both on a 
finding that the one-year residency requirement impermissibly inter-
fered with the fundamental right to travel and on some kind of "inter-
est in subsistence. "273 States could not require people to starve for a 
year; neither could Congress. Professor Michelman was undoubtedly 
correct in stating that the Court's concern was with "minimum pro-
tection" rather than equal protection per se,274 but equal protection 
was the best legal category to appeal to in striking down an unjust law. 
The dissents took a "fact" -less tack insofar as the story of those 
individuals portrayed by the arguments and the majority opinion was 
concerned: If there was any understanding of the situation of the peo-
ple involved on the part of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black 
and Harlan, it is not readily apparent. Warren's dissent, joined by 
Black, includes among other things an odd essay on the commerce 
clause in which congressional power to regulate and tax airlines and 
common carriers and Congress' interest in enhancing the flow of com-
merce is somehow equated with refusing to provide food, clothing, and 
shelter for the poor.275 In a peculiar footnote, with a "let them eat 
cake" ring to it, Warren stated, "All of the appellees in these cases 
found alternative sources of assistance after their disqualification."276 
271. 394 U.S. at 632. 
272. 394 U.S. at 632. 
273. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 7, 40 n.94 (1969). 
274. See id. at 9. 
275. 394 U.S. at 647-54. The opinion also contains a discussion of Congress' "plenary" 
power to regulate commerce, combined with cases involving the freedom of Americans to travel 
out of the country. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 
500 (1964); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). Additionally, Warren suggested that the existence 
of federal statutes on residency requirements ("Congress has imposed a residence requirement in 
the District of Columbia and authorized the states to impose similar requirements") might have 
mandated such requirements. 394 U.S. at 647-48. 
276. 394 U.S. at 650 n.5. 
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(True, all but one of the original plaintiffs were still alive;277 they had 
not starved to death.) For the Chief Justice to have dissented in a case 
crying with human need and evidencing apparent capriciousness and 
prejudice against poor people seems remarkable given his apparent re-
liance on empathy to reach many decisions. His failure to empathize 
in this case might be explained by his political experiences as attorney 
general and governor of California. In fact, he was attorney general of 
California when the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a Califor-
nia statute making it a criminal offense to bring an indigent person 
into the state.278 He had been a California Progressive, and California 
Progressivism had a strong nativist and xenophobic streak;279 Califor-
nia itself had been decidedly hostile to poor immigrants seeking a bet-
ter life during the Depression.280 This is somewhat speculative, but a 
bias against poor immigrants could easily have blocked Warren's usual 
capacity for empathic understanding.281 
Justice Harlan's dissent is thorough, careful, and very legalistic; he 
was honest in stating his underlying objection to the majority opinion 
as a violation of his belief that "it is an essential function of this Court 
277. Minnie Harrell had died of cancer by the time the case was reargued. Ironically, War-
ren's original majority opinion acknowledged that "the plight of the poor has pricked the Na-
tion's conscience . . . . To the extent that the appellees have attempted to show that durational 
residency requirements impose hardships upon the poor ... they appeal to the right instincts of 
all men." B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 225, at 326. But Warren then shifted deference to the 
legislature: "[l]nstinct cannot be our guide when we are asked to declare unconstitutional part of 
a statutory scheme enacted by Congress .... " Id. 
278. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). Warren, as attorney general, signed the 
Brief on Reargument in the case. California had made it a misdemeanor to transport nonresident 
indigents into the state; Edwards, a "sometime preacher,'' was convicted of violating the law. 
The ACLU of Northern California took the case and based its argument in the Supreme Court 
on the commerce clause. Cray, California Here I Come, CAL. LAW. Dec. 1986, at 50, 52. The 
Court majority agreed with the commerce clause theory, but Justices Douglas, Black, Murphy, 
and Jackson based their concurrences on the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. 314 U.S. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring); 314 U.S. at 182 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
279. G.E. WHITE, supra note 196, at 18-19, 35, 42. 
280. Cray, supra note 278, at 50-52. John Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath captures the 
California attitude toward the "Okies" as perhaps only literature can. 
281. Chief Justice Warren had originally found the case "an easy one," controlled by the 
Social Security Act's provision that residency requirements could not exceed one year. B. 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 225, at 304. At conference, Warren argued that Congress "allowed the 
one-year requirement" and that it had the power to do so. The conference voted 6-3 to uphold 
one-year residency requirements, and Warren assigned the majority opinion to himself. Id. at 
305. 
Warren's original circulated opinion manifested a concern with the Depression, the impact of 
welfare on state treasuries, and the history of the Social Security Act. Id. at 315-19, 326-27. 
Warren did acknowledge that the requirement imposed hardships, see id. at 326, and concluded 
the opinion with the observation that although the one-year residency requirements were not 
unreasonable and were within Congress' power, "[t]here is nothing to prevent Congress in the 
future from requiring the elimination of all residence requirements ..• . "Id. at 341. 
Justice Brennan, who had originally voted to uphold the residency requirements, read Justice 
Fortas' draft dissent and changed his vote at the next conference. Id. at 387. Justice Stewart 
refused to cast a vote; the Court was split 4-4 and the case was set for reargument. Id. 
June 1987] Legality and Empathy 1619 
to maintain the constitutional divisions between state and federal au-
thority and among the three branches of the Federal Government 
•••• "
282 Harlan was principled in his adherence to what he believed 
the proper role of the Court should be; what he failed to acknowledge 
implicitly or explicitly in his opinion were the human realities underly-
ing the case. His only reference to the narrative of the poor people 
was his agreement with the plaintiff's claim that the one-year resi-
dency requirement had only a "minuscule" effect on the choice to 
move;283 he interpreted this as having an "indirect impact" on the 
right to travel,284 rather than as an indication that several of the origi-
nal plaintiffs were returning to their home state, or rejoining their fam-
ilies, or migrating for reasons other than increased benefits. His list of 
"legitimate reasons" for imposing the one-year residency requirement 
favored predictability and control, as well as endorsed a rather xeno-
phobic approach to legislative allocation of resources: the residency 
requirement "will make more funds available for those whom the leg-
islature deems more worthy of subsidy"285 and who have "recently 
made some contribution to the state's economy."286 This was the 
"our people" argument of the state of Iowa. 287 It was a singularly 
unempathic response, legality at its best and worst, disembodied prin-
ciples and an underlying political belief system that limited the Court's 
role in addressing apparent injustices created by more "democratic" 
political bodies. Harlan never recognized the human beings affected in 
his dissent, perhaps because to have done so while reaffirming the one-
year residency requirement would have entailed a "let them eat cake" 
dismissal of the narrative. His not unjustified reticence to dictate 
spending programs to Congress or the states288 was undermined by the 
facts of the cases in Shapiro: it was more expensive to keep Barley at 
St. Elizabeth's; foster or institutional care for children was more ex-
pensive than AFDC.289 Harlan, troubled by the Court's fundamental 
rights analysis, argued that "[r]ights such as" "the right to pursue a 
particular occupation," "to receive greater or smaller wages or to 
work more or less hours," and "the right to inherit property" were "in 
principle indistinguishable from those involved here."290 He protested 
282. 394 U.S. at 677. 
283. 394 U.S. at 672. 
284. 394 U.S. at 672. 
285. 394 U.S. at 672. 
286. 394 U.S. at 674. 
287. Transcript of Reargument, in 68 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 234, at 363-64. 
288. See 394 U.S. at 674-75, 677. 
289. Transcript of Reargument, in 68 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 234, at 384. 
290. 394 U.S. at 661. 
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"the Court's cryptic suggestion ... that the 'compelling interest' test is 
applicable merely because the result of the classification may be to 
deny the appellees 'food, shelter, and other necessities of life' .... "291 
If one is talking about the requisites for existing at all, however, it 
seems that Harlan's failure to see a principled distinction between a 
law depriving the poor of having food to eat and a law making it un-
lawful to supply lenses without a prescription written by an ophthal-
mologist or optometrist292 is almost deliberate obtuseness. Harlan's 
dissent highlighted the tension between devotion to legality and use of 
empathy as ways of seeing the world. 
C. Abortion 
Professor Sylvia Law has written, "Nothing the Supreme Court 
has ever done has been more concretely important for women"293 than 
its decision to permit them access to abortions in Roe v. Wade 294 and 
Doe v. Bolton. 295 However true that statement may be, one must rec-
ognize that Roe has been as severely criticized as Brown L if not more 
so.296 Perhaps even more than they had in the race cases, many mem-
bers of the Court and the legal academy have shown a rather peculiar 
flight from the reality of women in the abortion cases. Thus, even 
though Roe was a victory for American women, the nature of the vic-
tory has rendered it vulnerable. In Brown, the Court saw the pain and 
stigma of being black in America; in the abortion cases, the Court has 
arguably failed to see the pain, despair, and stigma of women with 
"unwanted" pregnancies and "unwanted" children. (The two fre-
quently go together; as a social fact, it is women who have responsibil-
ity for child-rearing.) In part, perhaps, members of the Court have 
been unable to identify with women facing disastrous pregnancies. 
Perhaps because the narrative of "unwanted" pregnancy and its effect 
on women was underdeveloped when Roe was decided, the Court 
lacked appreciation of the human issues involved. Justice Powell, af-
291. 394 U.S. at 661 (emphasis added). 
292. 394 U.S. at 661 n.11 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)), 
293. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 981 (1984). 
294. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
295. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
296. The Reagan Administration, for example, has sought to "overrule" Roe by constitu-
tional amendment, litigation, and legislation. See Roberts, Reagan Said to Back Measure to Bar 
Any Federal Aid for Abortion, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1987, at A20, col. 1; see also notes 375-76 
infra and accompanying text. The Court's decision in Roe has been trashed in countless articles 
and law school classrooms. John Ely fired off an early volley in Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: 
A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); see also Epstein, Substantive Due Process 
by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP. Cr. REV. 159; Wardle, Rethinking Roe v. 
Wade, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 231. 
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ter his retirement from the Court in 1987, said, "I don't think I'd ever 
really thought about [abortion] seriously before."297 Perhaps mem-
bers of the Court did feel some empathy and concern for women, but 
did not have a way to articulate it. Perhaps the Court's failure was 
because of the enormous moral complexities of empathizing with 
fetuses - recharacterized as human infants - and women 
simultaneously. 
The briefs and the tapes of the oral arguments in Roe patently re-
veal that an empathic narrative about fetuses was developing. An ap-
peal to emotional identification with the fetus was obviously present in 
the brief for the State of Texas: the brief contained pictures of human 
development, together with a narrative humanizing the fetus, making 
the fetus capable of "conscious experience"298 and, indeed, making it 
"autonom[ous]."299 Women, in contrast, warranted only a two-page 
discussion in the Texas brief of their "interests"; they had a limited 
"right of privacy" versus the "right of the child to life."300 An amicus 
brief filed by dissenting members of the American College of Obstet-
rics and Gynecology argued that "the unborn child is as much a pa-
tient as is the mother."301 They declared: 
The unheard voices of these little ones are our concern, and we deplore 
this violent trend which is turning the healing art of medicine into a 
source of efficient swift and sure destruction of human life. A trend 
which will yield a "body count" unlike any we have seen in our nation's 
history [sic].302 
The use of the words "child" and "mother" in the brief cannot have 
been accidental - any more than the allusion to "body counts" at a 
time when the war in Vietnam was causing increased consternation. 
"Mother" and "child" evoke an image of caring and need for protec-
tion, respectively; only a mother who is evil would kill her child, and 
she is unworthy of empathy. 
Roe v. Wade was not well argued - counsel for both sides, none 
experienced advocates before the Court, seemed unprepared to answer 
questions, did not respond to questions, did not have facts at their 
297. Taylor, Powell on His Approach: Doing Justice Case by Case, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1987, 
at 1, col. 3. 
298. Brief for Appellee at 52, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18). 
299. Id. at 30; see generally Part D, The Human-ness of the Fetus, id. at 29-54. The woman's 
role in nurturing this autonomous human being seems almost trivial - she is, perhaps, simply 
the vessel. 
300. Id. at 28-29. Women are tangential even to the state's argument about the right to 
privacy in this section, however. 
301. Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae of Certain Physicians, Professors, and Fellows of the 
American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology in Support of Appellees at 31. 
302. Id. at 46. 
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disposal. 3o3 According to The Brethren, Justice Blackmun, the author 
of the opinion in Roe, thought the presentations "poor" and felt that 
the "abortion issue deserved a better presentation."304 Yet during oral 
arguments in Roe v. Wade in 1971, counsel for the state of Texas 
rather movingly referred to a Texas case that "held that the State had 
a compelling interest because of the protection of fetal life - of fetal 
life protection. They [the Texas court that upheld the statute] recog-
nized the humanness of the embryo, or the fetus, and they said we 
have an interest in protecting fetal life."305 In 1972, a different lawyer 
arguing for Texas immediately asserted: "But it is the position of the 
State of Texas that, upon conception, we have a human being .... "306 
And in a slowly paced summary of the "rights of the unborn child," 
counsel stated: 
This Court has been diligent in protecting the rights of the minority ... 
- a silent minority - the true silent minority. Who is speaking for 
these children? Where is the counsel for these unborn children whose 
life is being taken? Where is the safeguard of the right to trial by jury? 
Are we to place this power in the hands of a mother, and a doctor [said 
dismissively] - all of the constitutional rights . . . ?307 
These are children, not "fertilized eggs," "blastocysts," "fetuses," 
"blobs of protoplasm," or even "babies." In other words, the image is 
recognizably human. The Court in its questioning reflected a great 
concern with the argument that fetuses were children, grasping for 
historical, medical, and legal meanings of "person."308 Indeed, at one 
point, a member of the Court remarked that if fetuses were persons 
within the meaning of the Constitution, "you can sit down, you've 
won your case."309 And Justice Stewart in questioning counsel for 
Roe, stated, "Well, if - if it were established that an unborn fetus is a 
person, within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, you 
would have almost an impossible case here, would you not?" To 
303. Unlike Brown and Shapiro, the case was not argued by well-known law professors or 
seasoned Supreme Court advocates on either side. In listening to the tapes of the arguments, one 
becomes aware of substantial pauses, gaps, and misunderstandings. From a 1987 perspective, the 
opening remarks of counsel for the State of Texas in the first set of arguments is deeply offensive: 
"Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: It's an old joke, but when a man argues against two 
beautiful ladies like this, they are going to have the last word." Transcript of Oral Argument, in 
75 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 234, at 796. The silence on the tape recording of the argu-
ment following this remark suggests the "joke" did not amuse anyone; a different lawyer for 
Texas on reargument avoided such gaffes. 
304. B. WOODWARD & s. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 167 (1979) (Woodward and Arm-
strong's words, not Blackmun's). 
305. Transcript of Oral Argument, in 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 234, at 800. 
306. Id. at 818. 
307. Id. at 824. 
308. See id. at 795-96, 802-04, 813-14, 816-17, 818-20, 822-23, 825-29. 
309. Id. at 822. 
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which she replied, with a laugh(!): "I would have a very difficult 
case."310 (This concession returned to haunt women in the Court's 
opinion. )311 
On the other hand, the Court appeared to be singularly unable to 
hear the narrative of "unwanted" pregnancy. "Unwanted" may be an 
unfortunate word here, but I do not know of another word that cap-
tures the situation better. But "unwanted" seems to cover a contin-
uum from an inconvenient pregnancy that was wanted but not at the 
particular time to a pregnancy resulting from rape or incest or a life-
threatening pregnancy. Thus, it leaves the issue of choosing to have 
an abortion vulnerable to a male assumption that such choices can be 
or are frivolously or odiously made.312 While the brief for Jane Roe 
was strikingly lacking in facts or narrative about the pain and anguish 
of unwanted pregnancy, some of the amicus briefs did discuss the issue 
of women, of their pain, their reality; they developed a partial narra-
tive. 313 And in 1971, during oral argument, counsel for Jane Roe did 
try to tell the narrative of women faced with unwanted pregnancy: 
Texas ... would not allow any relief at all, even in situations where 
the mother would suffer perhaps serious physical and mental harm .... 
If the pregnancy would result in the birth of a deformed or defective 
child, she has no relief. Regardless of the circumstances of conception, 
whether it was because of rape, incest, whether she is extremely imma-
ture, she has no relief. 
I think it's without question that pregnancy to a woman can com-
pletely disrupt her life. Whether she's unmarried; whether she's pursu-
ing an education; whether she's pursuing a career; whether she has 
family problems; all of the problems of personal and family life, for a 
woman, are bound up in the problem of abortion.314 
After listing the consequences of pregnancy for women - aban-
donment of education because they were forced, by the schools them-
selves, to quit school, loss of jobs and support because they were 
forced to leave employment and were ineligible for unemployment 
compensation or welfare, the lack of a duty for employers to rehire 
women who had to "drop out" because of pregnancy, and the emo-
tional investment in raising a child - counsel argued: 
310. Id. at 817. Counsel earlier had suggested some form of "balancing" the "rights" of 
fetuses and women if fetuses were persons. Id. at 813. 
311. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57; see note 332 infra and accompanying text. 
312. These are not my words. The accusation is Robert Nagel's. See Nagel, supra note 79, 
at 175 & n.49. 
313. See generally Motion for Permission to File Brief and Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of 
New Women Lawyers, Women's Health and Abortion Project, Inc., National Abortion Action 
Coalition; Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of Organizations and Named 
Women in Support of Appellants in Each Case and Brief Amici Curiae. 
314. Transcript of Oral Argument, in 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 234, at 786-87. 
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So, a pregnancy to a woman is perhaps one of the most determinative 
aspects of her life. It disrupts her body. It disrupts her education. It 
disrupts her employment. And it often disrupts her entire family life. 
And we feel that, because of the impact on the woman, this certainly ... 
is a matter which is of such fundamental and basic concern to the wo-
man involved that she should be allowed to make the choice as to 
whether to continue or to terminate her pregnancy.315 
Very shortly thereafter, a member of the Court interjected: 
Mrs. Weddington, so far on the merits, you've told us about the impor-
tant impact of this law, and you made a very eloquent policy argument 
against it. And I trust you are going to get to what provisions of the 
Constitution you rely on. Sometimes the Court - we would like to, 
sometimes - but we cannot here be involved simply with matters of 
policy, as you know.316 
Was Mrs. Weddington's argument a "mere" policy argument - un-
like the arguments of counsel for Texas - or was she describing an 
important experiential truth about unwanted pregnancies that the 
Court chose to avoid?317 True, the need to hook up the narrative to a 
legal category was there, but there was also an apparent discomfort 
with the narrative that subsequently squelched the story. The argu-
ment shifted to legalism, standing, and the rights of "unborn 
children."318 
In the reargument of the case, counsel concentrated on standing 
and mootness, supporting the claims with fairly conclusory statements 
that the injury of unwanted pregnancy was irreparable.319 The Court 
then asked counsel if she agreed "that one of the important factors 
that has to be considered in this case is what rights, if any, does the 
unborn fetus have?"32° Counsel tried to argue, "It seems to me that it 
is critical, first, that we prove this is a fundamental interest on behalf 
315. Id. at 787 (emphasis on tape recording). 
316. Id. at 788. Counsel replied that the grounds were the ninth amendment and the four· 
teenth amendment's due process clause: 
We had originally brought this suit alleging both the due process clause, equal protection 
clause, the Ninth Amendment, and a variety of others. 
The Court: And anything else that might obtain. 
Mrs. Weddington: Yeah, right. 
Id. 
317. The Court, for example, explicitly manifested concern for women and the consequences 
of unwanted pregnancy in only one short series of questions: 
The Court: Texas doesn't grant any exemption in the case of a rape, where the woman's 
pregnancy has resulted from rape - either statutory or otherwise - does it? 
Mr. Floyd: There is nothing in our statute about that. Now, the procedure -
The Court: And such a woman wouldn't have had a choice, would she? 
Id. at 805. Perhaps the Court assumed it knew all it needed to know about women and preg· 
nancy. But this would seem doubtful. 
318. Id. at 789-96. 
319. Transcript of Reargument, in 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 234, at 811. 
320. Id. at 812. 
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of the woman, that it is a constitutional right."321 But she had no 
answer to "balancing" the questions raised if the Court were to deter-
mine the fetus was a person. Moreover, she never returned to the facts 
of unwanted pregnancy and failed to weave any narrative of women's 
experience back into her legal points. 
At least some members of the Court apparently have lacked empa-
thy when it comes to the experience of pregnant women. Furthermore, 
few indications exist that any of the Justices experienced - imagina-
tively or from knowing women faced .with the choice - what it means 
to be a woman with an unwanted pregnancy. Empathy for fetuses-
particularly third-trimester fetuses that look like human infants -
was much more present in Roe. Counsel for Roe herself stated, "Obvi-
ously I have a much more difficult time saying that the State has no 
interest in late pregnancy .... I think that's more the emotional re-
sponse to a late pregnancy ... " 322 Women were not the explicit con-
cern of the Justices, although the argument of counsel for Texas that 
any choice about pregnancy the woman makes is "prior to the time 
she becomes pregnant," prompted a Justice to ask about the woman 
who is raped: "And such a woman wouldn't have had a choice, would 
she?"323 In the final arguments on rebuttal, when Roe's counsel at-
tempted to bring women back into the picture, the Court's questions 
shifted to doctors and medical judgments. 324 
The opinion by Justice Blackmun in Roe v. Wade, while beginning 
with an anguished tone ("We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of 
the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy 
•••• "
325), quickly invoked the words of legality: "Our task, of course, 
is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion 
and predilection. " 326 The opinion was virtually free of the story of 
women. The story of unwanted pregnancy received comparatively 
short shrift, a paragraph in an opinion that is fifty-one pages long. 
The story of women appeared toward the end of the opinion, and it 
began with some emphasis placed on medical harm, concern for un-
wanted children, and a passing acknowledgement that "[m]aternity, or 
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and 
future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical 
health may be taxed by child care . . . . [T]he additional difficulties 
321. Id. at 813. 
322. Id. at 790. 
323. Id. at 798, 805. 
324. Id. at 832-33. 
325. 410 U.S. at 116. 
326. 410 U.S. at 116 (emphasis added). 
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and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. "327 
But "[t]he pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She 
carries an embryo, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions 
of the developing young in the human [sic] uterus .... "328 The story 
of women was almost nonexistent; the story of the law of abortion, of 
medical knowledge, and of doctors took its place. The focus was less 
on women, and more on fetuses, fetal life, and the responsibility of 
physicians and their "right" to administer treatment.329 In truth, Roe 
can be characterized as the "case of the Incredible Disappearing Wo-
man. "330 Even though the opinion stated that "the word 'person,' as 
used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn,"331 
it also stated that "[i]f [the] suggestion of personhood is established, 
the appellant's case, of course, collapses . . . . The appellant conceded 
as much on reargument. "332 
The standard - or at least easy - explanation for the opinion of 
the Court in Roe is that its author, Justice Blackmon, having been 
general counsel for the Mayo clinic, was more concerned with the 
"rights" of doctors than of women. 333 Yet this fails to explain why the 
other Justices who joined the opinion would "empathize" with doctors 
rather than women to the extent that Blackmun's opinion would sug-
gest. And in retrospect, it fails to explain why Justice Blackmun's sub-
sequent opinions have increasingly articulated the story of women.334 
According to The Brethren, Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas all sup-
ported an opinion based on "broad grounds of women's constitutional 
rights."335 Brennan reportedly felt the Blackmon opinion "focused on 
the rights of the doctor and the rights of the state. [But] [t]he most 
important party, the woman, had been largely neglected. Her rights 
were the ones that needed to be upheld."336 Stewart, however, be-
lieved Douglas' rationale in a 1971 case337 - that abortion was a pro-
327. 410 U.S. at 153. 
328. 410 U.S. at 159. 
329. 410 U.S. at 165-66. 
330. I am indebted to Professor George Alexander for this characterization. 
331. 410 U.S. at 158. 
332. 410 U.S. at 156-57 (emphasis added). 
333. I hear this repeatedly; The Brethren seems to permit this breezy inference, although the 
book also suggests Blackmun was aware of the importance of abortion to women, see B. WOOD· 
WARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 304, at 183, 238-39, and that he agonized over how best to 
write the opinion. Id. at 182-84, 229-37. 
334. See notes 383-84 infra and accompanying text. 
335. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 304, at 169. 
336. Id. at 231. 
337. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971) (holding District of Columbia statute mak· 
ing it a felony for doctors to perform abortions unless necessary to preserve woman's life or 
health not unconstitutionally vague); see 402 U.S. at 80 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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fessional medical judgment - was the proper approach. Stewart was 
the justice who insisted that the opinion state the "fetus was not ... a 
person. If [it] were a person, it had rights .... Weighing two sets of 
rights would be dangerous."338 Stewart allegedly was relieved that the 
first conference on Roe and Doe "focused on the professional rights of 
a doctor ... , rather than on the rights of a woman trying to obtain" 
an abortion.339 Justice Powell apparently relied on his own knowledge 
of well-to-do women going away to Switzerland or New York for 
abortions, and horror stories about back-alley abortionists from his in-
laws who were obstetricians, to conclude the antiabortion laws were 
"atrocious."340 He has recently indicated that he also "had been 
shocked that the Texas law ... appeared to bar abortion even in cases 
of rape and that he had been moved by arguments" that the constitu-
tional right of "liberty" included reproductive choices.341 Powell ap-
parently also was persuaded by a lower court's rationale that the 
moral decision to have an abortion was a judgment people couldn't 
"'impose upon others by force of law'."342 
It is difficult to ascertain whether there was much empathy for wo-
men from this limited information. Certainly, seven Justices lent their 
authority to a ruling virtually excluding the story of women and fram-
ing the legal issues more in terms of medical information and decision-
making. At the time the Court decided Roe, the women's movement 
was noticeably active, and concern with world overpopulation was on 
the political agenda. But recognition of the singular impact of preg-
nancy on one-half the population was not well articulated in the narra-
tives given the Court or in the language of the opinion. 
Another possible explanation for the opinion is that the Justices 
resolved the issues by denying the humanity of fetuses and women 
simultaneously.343 In the frequently if-then world oflegality, iffetuses 
are persons, the state has an obligation to protect their lives by ban-
ning abortions. If they are not persons, they have no more "right to 
life" than plants. If women are not persons, then their bodies and lives 
may be strictly controlled as well. (Doctors, who at the time the 
338. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 304, at 233 (Woodward and Armstrong's 
words, not Stewart's). 
339. Id. at 169. 
340. Id. at 230. 
341. Taylor, supra note 297, at 18, col. 4. 
342. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 304, at 230. The statement quoted by 
Woodward and Armstrong is found in Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 231 (D. Conn. 1972) 
(Newman, J.). 
343. I am indebted to Robin West for pointing this out to me. 
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Court reached its decision were predominantly male,344 were full-
:fledged human beings whose "rights" merited protection from prose-
cution, however.) The if-then structure of legality could create an 
either/or that had to be suppressed or denied; alternatively, any simul-
taneous empathy for fetuses and women could arguably also have led 
to decisional paralysis. 
But as Donald Regan later put it, "anyone who attempts simply to 
deny that there is an intrinsic horror to unwanted pregnancy lacks 
either imagination or compassion."345 Imagination and compassion, 
empathic understanding of women with unwanted pregnancies or 
compassion for them leading to action to help them, seem strangely 
lacking in Roe and in subsequent criticisms of the opinion, given that 
there was some effort to tell the story of the effect of unwanted preg-
nancy on women in amicus briefs and at oral argument. 346 The state 
has an interest in protecting "potential life": Is not the woman an 
"existing life" or at a minimum also a potential life? Perhaps the fail-
ure of empathy for women who somehow find themselves pregnant 
became evident in the reargument of Roe, when one Justice posed the 
question of choosing which life to protect: "Well, what would you 
choose? Would you choose to kill the innocent one, or what?"347 The 
implication seemed to be that women who "get themselves" pregnant 
are somehow blameworthy. By failing to see that forcing women with 
unwanted pregnancies to bear children causes the women great harm 
and suffering, calls upon them to endure physical and mental torment 
in a way we do not ask of any Good Samaritan,348 and chains them to 
serve other human wishes, 349 the Court created a doctrine extremely 
vulnerable to antiabortionist attack and unintelligible in its develop-
ment since Roe was decided. Not only had the Court engaged in the 
sin of "Lochnering," but it had done so badly.350 
The focus on fetuses rather than the women forced to bear them to 
344. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1975, at 75 (in 1973 there were 
335,800 male doctors and 30,600 female doctors). 
345. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1617 {1979). 
346. The outside legal record was not completely bare, either. See Law, supra note 293, at 
972-73. 
347. Transcript of Reargument, in 75 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 234, at 820 (emphasis 
added). 
348. Regan, supra note 345, at 1569, 1588. 
349. See Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of Organizations and Named 
Women in Support of Appellants in Each Case and Brief Amici Curiae at 6-16 (arguing forced 
pregnancy a violation of thirteenth amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude); see 
also Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of New Women Lawyers, Women's Health and Abortion 
Project, Inc., National Abortion Action Coalition at 25-33 (equal protection argument). 
350. Ely, supra note 296, at 937-43. 
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term by antiabortion laws may explain the doctrinal muddle of the 
Roe opinion itself as well as the peculiar development of post-Roe doc-
trine. By omitting consideration of over one-half of the narratives, a 
majority of the Court has frequently managed in subsequent opinions 
to retreat even farther from hearing the narrative of women. The 
meaning, the experience, of unwanted pregnancy for a woman is one a 
majority of the Court has often simply not accounted for in its written 
opinions or even at oral argument. In an area highly charged with 
emotion, the Court has often hidden in legalistic formulations, such as 
"statutory interpretation" and "deference" to legislative judgment.351 
At times, the Court has been singularly unable to hear the horror and 
pain of women and girls faced with unwanted pregnancy, even preg-
nancy caused by rape or incest. 352 
Subsequent majority opinions between 1973 and 1986 on the topic 
of abortion have failed again to say much about women. In part, this 
may be the result of reliance on the conceptual and legal category of 
"privacy" rather than "equal protection."353 In part, it may have been 
an unacknowledged (explicitly, that is) empathy for fetuses: The tri-
mester divisions of Roe v. Wade become intelligible when one sees pic-
tures of third trimester fetuses. The women, however, were faceless, 
and indeed nameless - disembodied accumulations of medical and 
social data. The facts about Jane Roe were sparse and conclusory; the 
narrative of her experience was nonexistent. The facts about other 
Does, Roes, and Moes were sketchy. Achieving empathy for such dis-
embodied women may have been extremely difficult. Without some 
information about why women choose to have an abortion, it may have 
been impossible for many of the male. Justices and male legal scholars 
to understand that simple interference with "the life plans of the 
mother"354 or merely inconveniently timed pregnancy - "frivolous" 
351. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 300-01 (1980); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 443-
44 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63-67 (1976). 
352. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980); 
see also Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A 
Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. RE.v. 1113, 1122-28 (1980) (arguing the Court 
overlooked illicit motives for legislation in praising democratic processes); Argument for Appel-
lees at 14-16, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (No. 79-1268). 
353. Professor Law has argued that the language of equal protection had been affected by the 
lack of success of equal protection analysis in other areas of the law affecting women, which, 
combined with the focus on the rights of fetuses and medical professional standards growing out 
of the Roe opinion itself, deflected discourse and legal argument from an equal protection analy-
sis. Law, supra note 293, at 985-87. 
354. Ely, supra note 296, at 926. While conceding that "[h]aving an unwanted child can go a 
long way toward ruining a woman's life," Ely then recharacterizes the question as "cramp[ing] 
the life style of an unwilling mother" while "the other side of the balance looks very different .... 
Abortion ends (or if it makes a difference, prevents) the life of a human being .... " Id. at 923-
24. 
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or "odious" motives355 - seldom has much bearing on a woman's 
decision to have an abortion. 356 The category of "privacy" also car-
ries an injunction - being "private" means one does not speak of such 
things, certainly not in public discourse.357 "Privacy" silences, even as 
it may tell the government that this is a subject it may not regulate. 
Indeed, recent strategies of Planned Parenthood and abortion rights 
advocates seem to have attempted to break the silence. Advertisements 
showing pictures of real women (and girls) telling real stories of their 
abortions - women "just like" middle-class women throughout 
America - have appeared in national magazines. And the National 
Abortion Rights Action League brief in the Thornburgh case in 1986 
contained the stories of actual women who had had abortions.358 
By the time Harris v. McRae 359 was decided, a majority of the 
Court had transformed what had seemed to be Roe's "fundamental 
right" to an abortion in the first trimester (and when the woman's 
health was at stake) into a nonright. Although "[i]t is well settled that 
... if a law 'impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly 
secured by the Constitution, [it] is presumptively unconstitu-
tional,' "360 the Court "concluded that the Hyde Amendment violates 
no constitutionally protected substantive rights."361 
The Hyde Amendment, in its most restrictive form, abolished fed-
eral funding of all abortions unless "the life of the mother would be 
endangered if the fetus were carried to term .... "362 The Court found 
it perfectly reasonable that 
3SS. See note 312 supra and accompanying text. 
3S6. "By restricting access to abortion, the state necessarily denies the capacity of women as 
independent moral decision-makers." Law, supra note 293, at 1019. In support of this denial of 
a woman's moral capacity to choose, I have heard endless horror stories about women who 
simply use abortion as a primary or backup birth control method. I do not deny that some 
individuals do abuse their freedom to choose; but I have also had experience listening to women 
confronted with unwanted pregnancies, and their choice entailed much moral agonizing. See 
also C. GILLIGAN, supra note 4S, at 64-127 (describing results of abortion decision study). As a 
woman, I do not accept the characterization of moral cretin simply because I would choose to 
have an abortion in some instances and not in others. 
3S7. CJ Brest & Vorenberg, Politics, Feminism, and the Constitution: The Anti-Pornography 
Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1987) (study inter alia of women breaking 
silence about effects of pornography and sexual abuse in Minnesota and transformation of public 
discourse). 
3S8. Brief for the National Abortion Rights Action League, et al. as Amici Curiae in support 
of Appellees, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986) (Nos. 84-
49S & 84-1379). 
3S9. 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding Hyde Amendment's prohibition on Medicaid funding 
for abortion even in form that included rape and incest cases). 
360. 448 U.S. at 312 (quoting Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. SS, 76 (1980) (plurality opinion)). 
361. 448 U.S. at 322. 
362. 448 U.S. at 302 (quoting the Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 
(1979)). 
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[b]y subsidizing the medical expenses of indigent women who carry their 
pregnancies to term while not subsidizing the comparable expenses of 
women who undergo abortions ... Congress has established incentives 
that make childbirth a more attractive alternative than abortion for per-
sons [sic] eligible for Medicaid. These incentives bear a direct relation-
ship to the legitimate congressional interest in protecting potential 
life.363 
This version of the story is startling in human terms: A congressional 
judgment that "childbirth" is somehow reducible to "economic incen-
tives" was acceptable. The majority found no equal protection 
problems, although the law affected three groups that arguably called 
for some form of heightened scrutiny: (1) women, (2) the poor, and 
(3) racial minorities.364 A rational relationship to protection of poten-
tial life was sufficient to uphold a law effectively prohibiting Medicare 
funding for abortions for poor women.365 The Court noted, "Abortion 
is inherently different from other medical procedures, because no 
other procedure involves the purposeful termination of a potential 
life. "366 
The dissenters, on the other hand, were well aware of the narrative 
of poor women. Justice Blackmun stated: 
There is "condescension" in the Court's holding that "she may go else-
where for her abortion"; this is "disingenuous and alarming"; the Gov-
ernment "punitively impresses upon a needy minority its own concepts 
of the socially desirable, the publicly acceptable, and the morally 
sound"; . . . there truly is "another world 'out there,' the existence of 
which the Court, I suspect, either chooses to ignore or fears to recognize" 
367 
Justice Marshall, quoting Blackmun's language that another world 
exists, asserted, "In my view, it is only by blinding itself to that other 
world that the Court can reach the result it announces today."368 
Marshall had argued in his dissent in Beal v. Doe that 
[a]n unwanted child may be disruptive and destructive of the life of any 
woman, but the impact is felt most by those too poor to ameliorate those 
effects. If funds for an abortion are unavailable, a poor woman may feel 
that she is forced to obtain an illegal abortion that poses a serious threat 
to her health and even her life .... If she refuses to take this risk, and 
undergoes the pain and danger of state-financed pregnancy and child-
birth, she may well give up all chance of escaping the cycle of poverty. 
363. 448 U.S. at 325. 
364. See 448 U.S. at 34344 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
365. See 448 U.S. at 325. 
366. 448 U.S. at 325 (emphasis added). 
367. 448 U.S. at 348-49 (quoting Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 462-63 (1977) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added)). 
368. 448 U.S. at 347 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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Absent day-care facilities, she will be forced into full-time child care for 
years to come .... All chance to control the direction of her own life 
will have been lost. 369 
In Harris v. McRae, Marshall reiterated that "[a]n indigent woman 
denied governmental funding for a medically necessary abortion is 
confronted with two grotesque choices."370 He concluded: 
In this case, the Federal Government has taken upon itself the bur-
den of financing practically all medically necessary expenditures. One 
category of medically necessary expenditure has been singled out for ex-
clusion, and the sole basis for the exclusion is a premise repudiated for 
purposes of constitutional law in Roe v. Wade. The consequence is a 
devastating impact on the lives and health of poor women. I do not 
believe that a Constitution committed to the equal protection of the laws 
can tolerate this result. I dissent. 371 
Justice Brennan, noting that "the Hyde Amendment is nothing 
less than an attempt by Congress to circumvent the dictates of the 
Constitution,"372 wrote in a lengthy footnote: 
It is important to put this congressional decision in human terms .... 
Even were one of the view that legislative hostility to abortions could 
justify a decision to fund [childbirth] ... while refusing to fund nonther-
apeutic abortions, the present statutory scheme could not be saved .... 
Its consequence is to leave indigent sick women without treatment sim-
ply because of the medical fortuity that their illness cannot be treated 
unless their pregnancy is terminated. Antipathy to abortion, in short, 
has been permitted not only to ride roughshod over a woman's constitu-
tional right to terminate her pregnancy ... , but also to distort our Na-
tion's health-care programs.373 
Depending upon which narrative the Justices paid heed to, and 
with whose story they appeared to empathize, the moral or metaethi-
cal structure of their opinions differed. The dissenters in Maher, Beal, 
and Doe invoked consequentialist and contextual ethical arguments; 
the majorities in those cases appeared to rely on deontological, syllo-
gistic ethical arguments. 374 And these differences appeared to be 
based on whether the Justices grappled with the issue of the humanity 
of women or denied it. 
A bare majority of the Court staved off an attempt to have Roe v. 
Wade overruled in Thornburgh 375 in 1986. The Reagan administra-
369. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 458-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
370. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 343 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
371. 448 U.S. at 348. 
372. 448 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
373. 448 U.S. at 331 n.4. 
374. Lake, The Metaethical Framework of Anti-Abortion Rhetoric, 11 SIGNS 478 (1986). 
375. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986). 
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tion had joined the case as amicus to urge the overruling of Roe, 316 
and given the original weakness of the doctrine, together with the ab-
sence of recognition of the experience of women, Roe was vulnerable. 
But in Thornburgh a bare majority upheld Roe - and the majority 
opinion acknowledged explicitly the actual meaning of the experience 
for women. 
In a running battle with the courts since Roe, the state of Penn-
sylvania had enacted laws in 1974, 1978, and 1982 to restrict abortion 
in a number of ways, including requiring spousal consent, abolishing 
advertisements for abortion clinics, and limiting funding for abortions. 
The 1982 legislation, titled the "Abortion Control Act,"377 was 
designed to limit abortions; it was patterned after an antiabortion or-
ganization's model statute.378 In Thornburgh, physicians, clergy, 
counselors, and others had sought declaratory and injunctive relief 
under section 1983 and had obtained a preliminary injunction against 
enforcement of the statute. Inter alia, the Pennsylvania law required 
"informed consent" for the abortion, which included requiring a doc-
tor to tell the woman that "medical assistance benefits may be avail-
able for prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care" and that the 
father would be liable to assist in supporting a child. 379 As part of 
"informed consent," a woman had to be told: 
There are many public and private agencies willing and able to help you 
carry your child to term, and to assist you and your child ... whether 
you choose to keep your child or place her or him for adoption. The 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania strongly urges you to contact them before 
making a final decision about abortion . ... 380 
In addition, a woman had to read materials printed and supplied by 
Pennsylvania that had to describe "the probable anatomical and physi-
ological characteristics of the unborn child [sic] at two-week gesta-
tional increments . . . including any relevant information on the 
possibility of the unborn child's [sic] survival."381 
376. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 2, 23-30. 
Thornburgh thus became a battle over Roe; "82 members of Congress" urged the Court to over-
rule Roe, see Brief Amicus Curiae of U.S. Sen. Gordon J. Humphrey (R-N.H.), U.S. Sen. Orrin 
G. Hatch (R-Utah), U.S. Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-N.J.), U.S. Rep. Alan B. Mullohan (D-
W. Va.) and certain other members of the Congress of the United States in Support of Appellants 
at 2, 5, 25. But 81 members of Congress filed a brief in opposition to the Reagan administration's 
position and urged the upholding of Roe. Brief Amicus Curiae of Senator Bob Packwood (R-
Ore.), Representative Don Edwards (D-Calif.), and certain other members of the Congress of the 
United States in Support of Appellees at 1, 3-4. 
377. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3201-20 (Purdon 1983). 
378. See Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2173-74. 
379. 106 S. Ct. at 2178-79. 
380. 106 S. Ct. at 2179 (emphasis added). 
381. 106 S. Ct. at 2179. 
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The perception of the majority was of a law meant to intimidate 
women into having children, no matter what the cost to those women. 
The perception of the dissenters was that Roe was bad law and, essen-
tially, that the fetus, not the woman, was the state's legitimate con-
cern. Women were just not "present" in the dissents, while they were 
very present in Blackmun's opinion. Acknowledging the Court's run-
ning battle with the states after the Roe decision, Justice Blackmun's 
majority opinion made reference to the resistance to school desegrega-
tion by quoting Brown v. Board of Education IL· " '[I]t should go 
without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles can-
not be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.' 
The States are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health 
or potential life, to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies."382 
The opinion by Justice Blackmun stated that the "informed con-
sent" requirements and materials 
seem ... to be nothing less than an outright attempt to wedge the Com-
monwealth's message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the in-
formed-consent dialogue between a woman and her physician. . . . [I]t 
may serve only to confuse and punish her and to heighten her anxiety, 
contrary to accepted medical practice. . . . 
The requirements ... that the woman be advised that medical assist-
ance benefits may be available, and that the father is responsible for fi-
nancial assistance in the support of the child similarly are poorly 
disguised elements of discouragement for the abortion decision .... For a 
patient with a life-threatening pregnancy, the "information" in its very 
rendition may be cruel as well as destructive of the physician-patient re-
lationship. As any experienced social worker or counsellor knows, theo-
retical financial responsibility often does not equate with fulfillment. And 
a victim of rape should not have to hear gratuitous advice that an uniden-
tified perpetrator is liable for support if she continues the pregnancy to 
term. 383 
These observations by Blackmun appear to illustrate an empathic un-
derstanding of the experience of women who have an unwanted -
disastrous - pregnancy. 
The majority opinion in Thornburgh also reflected some of the nar-
rative of women with unwanted pregnancies that had been largely un-
told in Roe and its progeny; it rescued abortion as a fundamental right 
from the clutches of the Harris v. McRae majority's denigration of that 
right. The conclusion of the majority opinion in Thornburgh stated, 
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a 
382. 106 S. Ct. at 2178 (citation omitted) (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 
300 (1955)). The language and analogy to Brown II also appeared in the Brief Amicus Curiae of 
Senator Bob Packwood, et al., supra note 376, at 4. 
383. 106 S. Ct. at 2179-80 (emphasis added). 
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promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept 
largely beyond the reach of government. That promise extends to women 
as well as men. Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more 
properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than 
a woman's decision - with the guidance of her physician and within the 
limits specified in Roe - whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's 
right to make that choice freely is fundamental. Any other result, in our 
view, would protect inadequately a central part of the sphere of liberty 
that our law guarantees equally to all. 384 
The National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) had sub-
mitted an amicus brief in Thornburgh "to place the realities of abor-
tion in women's lives before this Court and to urge this Court to 
reaffirm Roe . . . . The circumstances of women's lives and women's 
compelling reasons for choosing to have abortions elucidate the strong 
Constitutional foundations for [Roe]. "385 The brief consisted largely 
of excerpts from letters written by women who, although remaining 
anonymous perhaps because of fear of retaliation by "the anti-choice 
people,"386 do tell the stories of their own abortion experiences and 
make concrete the reality of women. The narratives do seem directed 
toward appealing to the Justices' possible visions of family planning 
and the central role of the family, which Professor Grey had posited 
earlier as the real reason behind the privacy decisions. 387 Of the 
thirty-eight excerpted stories of abortion, it is evident that in twelve 
the woman was married and the question of abortion was a family-
planning matter; in several other stories, the women had subsequently 
married and become mothers.388 Nevertheless, the stories do support 
NARAL's claim that "[t]he condition of the law determines the condi-
tion of women's lives,"389 and they illustrate the reality of those lives. 
NARAL's narratives first established the effect of laws prohibiting 
or restricting abortion on women wanting one: 
I remember Tijuana. I remember bugs crawling on walls as I waited for 
the "second part" of my abortion to take place. The first part was done 
in comparatively clean surroundings - "a clinic" - but I was too far 
along for the abortion to be done in one procedure, so I was sent to a 
"hotel" to wait three hours - a stinking cesspool of urine, sweat, filthy 
sheets and bugs .... Where else could I have gone in 1963? A name 
from a hairdresser passed through the underground grapevine by other 
384. 106 S. Ct. at 2184-85 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
385. Brief for the National Abortion Rights Action League, supra note 358, at 5. 
386. Id. at 6 n.2. 
387. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 
1980, at 83. 
388. See Brief for the National Abortion Rights Action League, supra note 358, at 8-30. 
389. Id. at 8. 
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desperate women seeking a life of dignity and choice. 390 
* * * * 
[Vol. 85:1574 
Having an abortion in Illinois in 1957 was a demeaning experience. I 
bad to lie, two doctors who did not know me had to lie, and my own 
doctor had to lie .... No matter that I had had a miscarriage one month 
previously, and my uterus looked like chopped liver, and I was in a great 
deal of pain .... 391 
Next, the brief argued for upholding Roe on the basis of the due 
process rights of privacy and liberty relied upon in Roe. "The right to 
choose to have an abortion is so personal and so essential to women's 
lives and well-being that without this right women cannot exercise 
other fundamental rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion. "392 The rights and liberties were those mentioned in Meyer v. 
Nebraska; 393 the brief tied the narratives to 
the right of the individual ... to engage in any of the common occupa-
tions of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and 
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his [sic] 
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges ... essential to 
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men [sic].394 
The brief included narratives that told how actual women would 
have had to leave their jobs, quit their schooling, marry. They would 
have exhausted themselves in trying to meet responsibilities to family 
members, bowed to religious beliefs not their own, and surrendered 
control of their lives and destinies had they not had abortions.395 No 
longer anonymous abstractions, women became concrete - if un-
named - human beings. 396 These women were not moral idiots; they 
had carefully considered their choice. For example: 
As for adoption, I very much respect those women having gone that 
route. It is a truly selfless act of love. But for myself, I knew if I was to 
have a baby, I would want to keep it. Envisioning what my life would be, 
an unskilled, unwed mother, my child would not have two parents but 
one working parent. That's not the life I wanted to give my child and not 
what I wanted myself .... Now almost ten years after, I am married and 
a full-time mother of two. When we first heard my son's fetal heartbeat I 
cried tears of joy.397 
* * * * 
390. Id. at 8-9. 
391. Id. at 10. 
392. Id. at 18. 
393. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
394. Brief for the National Abortion Rights Action League, supra note 358, at 22-23 (quot-
ing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
395. See id. at 23-30. 
396. See id. at 5-6 & n.2 (explaining need for anonymity because of privacy concerns and 
concerns about harassment). 
397. Id. at 26. 
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I am a junior in college and am putting myself through because my 
father has been unemployed and my mother barely makes enough to 
support the rest of the family. I have promised to help put my brother 
through when I graduate next year and it's his tum. I was using a dia-
phragm for birth control but I got pregnant anyhow. There is no way I 
could continue this pregnancy because of my responsibilities to my fam-
ily. I never wanted to be pregnant and if abortion were not legal I would 
do one on myself. 398 
Although the brief framed the narratives to fit the doctrinal limita-
tions of Roe and the cases upon which Roe relied, it gave them an 
equal protection gloss: "With the right to choose abortion, women are 
able to enjoy, like men, the right to fully use the powers of their minds 
and bodies."399 
The dissenters attacked both Roe and the majority opinion in 
Thornburgh. Justice White urged overruling Roe, by implication mak-
ing it synonymous with two constitutional horror stories, Lochner and 
Plessy. 400 White, agreeing "that a woman's ability to choose an abor-
tion is a species of 'liberty,' " denied that it is so " 'fundamental' that 
restrictions upon it call into play anything more than the most mini-
mal judicial scrutiny."401 White concentrated on the fetus: "The gov-
ernmental interest at issue is in protecting those who will be citizens if 
their lives are not ended in the womb. . . . [T]he state's interest, if 
compelling after viability, is equally compelling before viability."402 
Therefore, permitting the legislature to enact a broad range of limita-
tions on or outright prohibition of abortion would be a "highly desir-
able" result "from the standpoint of the Constitution."403 "Such 
issues, in our society, are to be resolved by the will of the people 
"404 
The women's side of the story never appeared in Justice White's 
opinion: Because abortion was "a hotly contested moral and political 
issue,"405 states presumably could ignore the pain inflicted on women 
as a result of forcing them to bear children. White dismissed the ma-
jority's concern for the pain women would experience in receiving 
Pennsylvania's information as "primarily rhetorical,'' rather than an 
acknowledgment of the experience of women.406 (Since when did 
398. Id. at 24. 
399. Id. at 23 (emphasis added). 
400. 106 S. Ct. at 2193 (White, J., dissenting). 
401. 106 S. Ct. at 2194 (emphasis added). 
402. 106 S. Ct. at 2196-97. 
403. 106 S. Ct. at 2197. 
404. 106 S. Ct. at 2197. 
405. 106 S. Ct. at 2197. 
406. 106 S. Ct. at 2199. 
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rhetoric, a perfectly good method of argument, become a pejorative?) 
White narrowed his analysis to "maximization of choice," missing en-
tirely the larger issue: the coercive aspects of the Pennsylvania law 
and its effect on women. Instead, he found "legitimate" state interests 
present, denied that the effect of unwanted pregnancy could be devas-
tating for women, and denied the existence of any fundamental pri-
vacy interest. The accepted story for White was exclusively that of the 
human fetus. 
D. The Power of Prejudice: Bowers v. Hardwick 
I have endeavored to illustrate how narratives of feeling and the 
meaning of human experience may lead to empathic understanding of 
the human dimensions of a legal problem, and, accordingly, to a redef-
inition of the legal issues. By grasping the human dimension, the deci-
sionmaker is faced with a moral dimension as well. That law can have 
moral consequences is inescapable; to decide responsibly requires 
awareness of those consequences. The strong claim for empathic un-
derstanding is that the moral decision, the moral result, will be closer 
to the good than it otherwise would be. When empathic knowledge 
fails, or is not even attempted, the resulting decision can be appalling 
in human terms. A recent extreme example of the point may be found 
in the Supreme Court's majority opinions in Bowers v. Hardwick. 407 
Hardwick bristles with emotion, to be sure, but it is the emotion of 
hate, not that of empathy. The majority opinions powerfully manifest 
the phenomena of prejudice, stereotypy, blind categorization, and de-
nial of the humanity of a group of people. As a result, the question of 
whether the state may invade a person's home to monitor his or her 
sexual practices appears to have been answered in the affirmative, and 
at least ten percent of the population may be persecuted because of 
their sexual practices. (While one author might call the majority's re-
action "contrast empathy,"408 I prefer to omit that term from the lexi-
con, because it appears to encompass something other than a 
perversion of empathy.) 
Michael Hardwick had been cited for drinking in public by an of-
ficer concerned by "big city 'garbage.' "409 He missed his first court 
appearance, and a warrant for his arrest was issued and given to the 
citing officer. Hardwick learned that the officer had come by his home 
407. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). 
408. EMPATHY AND BIRTH ORDER, supra note 41, at 3, 9 (Sadistic persons might feel joy at 
another's pain; others may feel envy at another's joy, etc.). 
409. Harris, The New Symbol of Gay Rights, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Sept. 7, 1986, at IG, 
col. I, 2G, col. I. 
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with the warrant, raced down to the courthouse, paid his fine, and 
forgot about it. The issuing court never recalled the warrant, and the 
officer never found out that Hardwick had paid his fine. He appeared 
with the warrant at Hardwick's home one afternoon. A house guest 
admitted the officer, who found Hardwick engaging in oral sex with 
another man in his own bedroom. The officer also saw some mari-
juana in the room. Hardwick said he had paid the fine; but the officer 
had seen him committing a felony under Georgia law and arrested him 
on the warrant and the felony committed in his presence.410 
The ACLU found the case to be a "dream" for challenging the 
Georgia sodomy law. "Hardwick, a bartender whose activism was 
limited to marching in the Gay Pride parade," was in his own bed-
room with another male adult.411 The case was not one which in-
volved someone who had also been charged with a serious violent 
crime. Hardwick chose to challenge the Georgia sodomy statute after 
having been contacted by the ACLU; he lost his job as a result. His 
neighbor came to the preliminary hearing and congratulated the of-
ficer for cracking down, reportedly fed up with "the naked sunbathing, 
the wild parties."412 
Hardwick had had a brush with heroin when he was a teenager, 
had been rehabilitated, and had counseled other kids. At twenty-one, 
he realized he was gay, moved to Atlanta, and "melted into the gay 
world."413 At one point "a good-time guy," according to his ex-lover, 
Hardwick now is serious, active in gay rights, and active in publicizing 
the meaning of the sodomy statutes to heterosexuals as well. 414 
Mr. Hardwick never appeared in the briefs or arguments as a 
human being. Except for one paragraph at the beginning of the Elev-
enth Circuit's opinion, stating that he was arrested "because he had 
committed the crime of sodomy with a consenting male adult in the 
bedroom of his own home,"415 the courts' opinions contain no clue as 
to who the man was. He became another disembodied person onto 
whom fears, prejudices, and false beliefs could be projected. 
The Georgia statute by its terms covered all "sodomy" - defined 
as both oral and anal sex - committed by heterosexuals or homosexu-
als.416 Yet the state argued the statute was meant to apply only to 
410. Id. at 2G, col. 2. 
411. Id. 
412. Id. at 2G, col. 3. 
413. Id. at 2G, col. 6. 
414. Id. at lG, cols. 1-2. 
415. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir. 1985). 
416. 760 F.2d at 1204 n.1. The statute provides as follows: 
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homosexuals, despite a legislative history indicating that it also cov-
ered heterosexuals.417 Moreover, a married couple who had joined in 
the suit had been declared to have no standing to challenge the statute. 
The focus of the case for Georgia became homosexual sodomy.418 
And, by focusing on homosexual sodomy, the Georgia briefs and oral 
arguments, together with the briefs filed in support of the statute, were 
left free to smuggle in a homophobic message and appeals to prejudice 
- something that would have been far more difficult if the arguments 
had also been against permitting married couples to engage in oral sex 
in their own homes in the 1980s. At oral argument, counsel for Geor-
gia returned again and again to homosexual sodomy.419 
The stereotypes of homosexuals as dangerous, perverted, and child 
molesters, coupled with the fear of AIDS, were fully exploited by the 
State of Georgia and amici. Georgia's opening brief argued: 
If morality is a legitimate state purpose, the identification of that moral-
ity, "the widely held values" of the people, should be voiced through 
their representatives. The legislative process is acutely [sic] designed for 
this purpose, whereas the judiciary may be inclined to make determina-
tions upon more empirical evidence, to which this area is not particularly 
amenable. . . . For example, it should be permissible for the General 
Assembly to find as legislative fact that homosexual sodomy leads to 
other deviate practices such as sado-masochism, group orgies, or trans-
vestism, to name only a few. Homosexual sodomy is often practiced 
outside the home such as in public parks, rest rooms, "gay baths," and 
"gay bars," and is marked by the multiplicity and anonymity of sexual 
partners, a disproportionate involvement with adolescents, and, indeed a 
possible relationship to crimes of violence. Similarly, the legislature 
should be permitted to draw conclusions concerning the relationship of 
homosexual sodomy in the transmission of [AIDS], ... anorectal gonor-
rhea, Hepatitis ... enteric protozoa! diseases, and Cytomegalovirus .... 
But perhaps the most profound legislative finding that can be made is 
that homosexual sodomy is the anathema of the basic units of our society 
- marriage and the family .... 
. . . If the legal distinctions between the intimacies of marriage and 
homosexual sodomy are lost, it is certainly possible to make the assump-
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual 
act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another .••• 
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not 
less than one nor more than 20 years .... 
GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-6-2 (1984). 
417. 106 S. Ct. at 2857; Brief of Petitioner Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia 
at 6, 20, passim; Official Transcript Proceedings Before The Supreme Court of the United States 
at 5, 9-10, Bowers v. Hardwick (No. 85-140) [hereinafter Official Transcript]. 
418. Official Transcript, supra note 417, at 3 ("This case presents the question of whether or 
not there is a fundamental right under the Constitution of the United States to engage in consen· 
sual private homosexual sodomy."). 
419. Id. at 3, 7, 9, 11, 16. 
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tion ... that the order of society, our way of life, could be changed in a 
harmful way.420 
Sodomy, bestiality, incest, and adultery are mentioned in the same 
breath. Children and teenagers would fall prey to all sorts of sexual 
perversions, abuses, and exploitation if the Court struck down a sod-
omy statute directed at all, but allegedly enforced only against same-
sex offenders. 
"Concerned Women for America" filed an amicus brief proclaim-
ing, "We oppose any laws designed to grant special legal protection to 
those who engage in homosexuality. Such laws are an affront to public 
morality and our dedication to family life."421 The brief argued that 
the history of sodomy laws compelled a finding of constitutionality.422 
Another amicus brief raised the specter of AIDS, "[a]s counsel [for 
Georgia] indicated that they would probably not raise the public 
health concerns before this Court .... "423 But the brief went beyond 
the issue of AIDS and argued that "[i]n responding to the current 
health crisis, a state legislature should be free to conclude that there is 
a need for reinforcement of traditional sexual mores."424 Moreover, 
the brief condoned the questionable use of criminal sanctions to pre-
vent AIDS. 
Historical hatred, the terror of AIDS, and stereotypes of gays as 
child molesters and criminals haunt these briefs. Stereotypy blocks 
empathy,425 and in the case of an out-group so characterized solely 
420. Brief of Petitioner Michael H. Bowers at 36-38 (emphasis added). 
421. Brief of Concerned Women for America Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2. 
422. See id. at 4 ("For most of American history, all states have had criminal sodomy 
laws .... [N]o historical evidence exists that the Framers ... intended to eliminate the states' 
power to regulate homosexual activity."). 
423. Brief of David Robinson, Jr. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2. 
424. Id. at 30. 
425. G. ALLPORT, supra note 99, at 192, 434-36. Stereotypy "acts both as justificatory de-
vice for categorical acceptance or rejection of a group, and as a screening or selective device to 
maintain simplicity in perception and in thinking." Id. at 192. The difficulties encountered in 
trying to cut through a common stereotype of homosexuals are illustrated by the following ex-
change between Senator Strom Thurmond and Jeffrey Levi, executive director of the National 
Gay and Lesbian Task Force, during the hearings on the appointment of Justice Rehnquist as 
Chief Justice: 
Mr. Thurmond: Does your organization advocate any kind of treatment for gays and lesbi-
ans to see if they can change them and make them normal like other people? 
Mr. Levi: Well, Senator, we consider ourselves to be quite normal .... 
Mr. Thurmond: You don't think gays and lesbians are subject to change or you don't think 
they could .... 
Mr. Levi: No more so, Senator, than .... 
Mr. Thurmond: ... don't think they could be converted so they'd be like other people, in 
some way? 
Mr. Levi: Well, we ... think we are like other people with one small exception. And 
unfortunately it's the rest of society that makes a big deal out of that exception. 
Mr. Thurmond: A small exception? It's a pretty big exception, isn't it? 
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because of sexual orientation, prejudices and irrationality about 
human sexuality also block an ability to understand. 426 
What of the "other side"? Michael Hardwick is a real human be-
ing, but his particular story was absent in the Supreme Court. The 
story of gays was largely absent as well. Professor Lawrence Tribe's 
brief responded to Georgia's claims about homosexuals and morality 
by arguing that "the only issue is the relevant standard of [constitu-
tional scrutiny], not the validity" of the statute.427 Only at trial "may 
the untried questions of fact to which Georgia alludes in its brief be-
come relevant."428 This was an argument oflegality, not empathy, and 
it failed to provide the Court a way to understand homosexuality be-
yond the effective appeals to prejudice contained in the petitioner's 
brief. As a legal tactic, it may have made sense to attempt to give the 
Court a narrow way out of having to decide whether the statute vio-
lated constitutional principles. But the brief only perfunctorily rebut-
ted Georgia's claims that the statute could prevent the transmission of 
disease (particularly AIDS), or could "deter its citizens from defecting 
to a homosexual lifestyle";429 nor did it seriously deal with whether 
the statute deterred at all. These issues took up only a page at the end 
of the brief,430 hardly enough to counter the appeal to prejudice. Only 
in a footnote did the respondent's brief explicitly confront Georgia's 
appeal to prejudice: 
Even if the State's imaginative recasting of the 30 million Americans 
who comprise our homosexual population as a furtive criminal under-
class ... had the slightest basis in fact, rather than in irrational fear and 
prejudice ... , the State appears to have missed the point that nothing in 
Respondent's argument claims any special protection for [public] sexual 
activity .... 431 
Both in the respondent's opening brief and in many of the amicus 
briefs, there was much discussion of heterosexuals. 432 This was not 
Mr. Levi: Unfortunately, society makes it a big exception. We wish it wouldn't and we 
would - that's why our organization exists. 
Mr. Thurmond: Well, we thank you all for coming and testifying, and you're now excused. 
Required Reading: Thurmond on Homosexuality, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1986, at 6, col. 4. 
426. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 27; see also id. at 3-4. 
427. Id. at 27 (emphasis in original). 
428. Id. 
429. Id. at 28. This was apparently a response to Georgia's assertion that homosexuals are 
disproportionately involved with adolescent "recruitment." The recruitment claim seemed to be 
less an issue in the brief than the shocking sexual perversity of gays. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner 
at 36-37. 
430. See Brief for Respondent at 27-28. 
431. Id. at 22 n.38. 
432. See id. at 5, 12-13, 17, 28; Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association 
and American Public Health Association in Support of Respondents at 5-6, 7-8, 12-19; Brief 
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"wrong," because the statute was extremely vulnerable to attack as 
invalid on its face, and the right-to-privacy decisions which were being 
relied on to argue for a right to noninterference with sexual intimacy 
involved heterosexuals. But again the brief failed to tell the story of the 
actual plaintiff and of gay people, thus leaving the stereotype unan-
swered. 433 Because the heterosexual married couple's attack on the 
statute was co-opted early, when the state admitted it would not en-
force the statute against married couples and stressed that it was ho-
mosexual sodomy it sought to prevent, the state challenged 
Hardwick's lawyers to answer the stereotype and they failed to 
respond. 
Surely it was a good, reasonable approach to argue that the Geor-
gia sodomy statute did not just punish "them" but also punished fine, 
upstanding husbands and wives.434 Moreover, the likelihood of at 
least some of the Supreme Court's Justices being more at ease with the 
notion of married heterosexuals engaging in these particular sexual 
practices would seem to aid the challenge to the statute on the grounds 
of its facial invalidity. Yet the focus in the Georgia brief and the briefs 
in support of the statute was on the Other, and the fact that Hardwick 
was a homosexual and that the stress was on homosexuality seems to 
demand a response narrative about the Other. The vision of the 
macho, leatherclad, gay male or the drag queen was never dispelled. 
That gays are members of Congress, stockbrokers, lawyers, doctors, 
truck drivers, authors, athletes - in other words, human beings -
never appeared in the briefs or arguments. 
At oral argument, Professor Tribe began by stating, "This case is 
about the limits of governmental power," listed what the case was not 
about, and finished his opening statement by saying: 
The power invoked here, and I think we must be clear about it, is the 
power to dictate in the most intimate and, indeed, I must say, embarrass-
ing detail how every adult, married or unmarried, in every bedroom in 
Georgia will behave in the closest and most intimate association with 
another adult.435 
Amicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Project, Women's Legal Defense Fund, Equal Rights Advo-
cates, Inc., et al. at 5-6, 17-19. 
433. Saying "almost everyone does it" might have had merit if the only concern had been 
whether particular sexual practices were common, but the stereotype is far more global than that, 
as indicated by the Georgia brief. See text at note 420 supra. 
434. See Brest, Supreme Court Proscribes a View of Privacy, L.A. Times, July 13, 1986, § V, 
at 2, col. 5. Professor Brest pointed out that "[h]ad the Court invalidated the statute as written, 
the legislature might have responded with a law that punished only homosexuals." This cer-
tainly provided an "excuse" for the Court to preempt future challenges. Brest's further point 
that the legislature "likely ... would have let the matter rest - for political, moral or humani-
tarian reasons" - seems optimistic given the fear of AIDS as a "gay plague." 
435. Official Transcript, supra note 417, at 17-18. 
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Perhaps this approach was meant to deflect any discomfort with the 
sexuality issue, but it was an extremely defensive tack for argument. 
Tribe went on to make a somewhat incoherent and tentative argument 
that government regulation of sexual intimacy in the home called for 
some form of "heightened scrutiny" - although exactly what kind of 
scrutiny he called for was unclear. 436 There was no real attempt to 
elucidate a freedom of intimate association437 or explicitly to confront 
and rebut Georgia's claim that the Constitution does not protect a 
"right which is little more than one of self-gratification and indul-
gence."438 Nor did the argument address the problem of prejudice. 
Tribe stated, instead: 
I think it is important to stress, [the principles ofliberty] do not place on 
a constitutional pedestal as though receiving this Court's particular ap-
proval, the particular acts involved in a case like this. I think . . . it is 
misleading to say that we are championing a fundamental right to com-
mit a particular sexual act. 
We are saying that there is a fundamental right to restrict govern-
ment's intimate regulation of the privacies of association like in the 
home. The principle that we champion is a principle of limited govern-
ment, it is not a principle of a special catalogue of rights.439 
Many of the amicus briefs attempted to argue gays were no differ-
ent than heterosexuals in their sexual practices, but the focus on sex 
alone may have been unfortunate. Ironically, the rubric of privacy 
does not appear to have curbed explicit discussion of human sexual 
functioning. At times the briefs read more like sex manuals than life 
stories of human beings who happen to be attracted to the same gen-
der. 440 The amicus brief filed by the Lesbian Rights Project et al. 
noted that "the overwhelming majority of persons engaging in sexual 
activities that would violate Georgia's law, then, are persons of hetero-
sexual orientation."441 While the brief also forthrightly characterized 
Georgia's arguments as "homophobic,"442 it relied on examples of het-
erosexual sexual practices as well to illustrate, time and again, that 
homosexuals were essentially no different in their mode of sexual ex-
436. See id. at 20-21, 23-24, 25-26, 32. "Heightened scrutiny" may have meant the type of 
"substantial and important state interest" or "intermediate standard of review" approach used in 
gender classification cases. See P. BRESr & S. LEVINSON, supra note 112, at 584. 
437. For an excellent, sensitive discussion of the meaning and importance of this concept, see 
Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). 
438. Official Transcript, supra note 417, at 16. 
439. Id. at 36-37. 
440. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association and American Public 
Health Association in Support of Respondents at 5, 8, 15-19; Brief Amicus Curiae for Lesbian 
Rights Project at 4-11, 17-18. 
441. Brief Amicus Curiae for Lesbian Rights Project at 6. 
442. Id. at 12-13. 
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pression. The brief observed candidly that it may be likely that "police 
officers, judges, jurors, prosecutors and others involved in enforcing 
the Georgia law" were likely to be lawbreakers themselves.443 (And 
the argument appears to have some merit: the officer who arrested 
Hardwick refused to answer a polygraph test question of whether he 
had ever broken the law, until it was rephrased to ask whether he had 
ever committed "a serious undetected felony.")444 The American Psy-
chological Association's amicus brief argued that homosexuals were 
no more or less psychologically disturbed than heterosexuals,445 and 
that both homosexuality and "sodomy" were common in western cul-
tures. 446 Homosexuals were like everyone else in their need for inti-
mate, continuous relationships.447 
Only one amicus brief explicitly made an equal protection argu-
ment. The National Organization for Women argued that homosexu-
ality should be considered a suspect classification.448 The brief argued 
that homosexuals were subject to "pervasive and damaging" discrimi-
nation, evidenced "by certain briefs filed in this case."449 No evidence 
in the record supported the assertion that homosexuality was a matter 
of choice or that it "has a detrimental effect upon an individual's con-
tributions to society."450 Thus, NOW argued, the Court should have 
subjected the Georgia statute to heightened scrutiny, and, under that 
scrutiny, should have held the statute violative of the equal protection 
clause. 
The briefs and arguments by Georgia and its supporters found a 
receptive audience in a majority of the Supreme Court Justices. The 
majority opinion of Justice White was as poorly crafted legally as was 
the opinion in Roe and arguably the opinion in Brown. Perhaps the 
appeal to, or at least the availability of, prejudice explains the hostility 
of Justice White's and Chief Justice Burger's opinions to Hardwick's 
claim. In an opinion "so lacking in legal craft that it makes one won-
der what was going on,"451 Justice White relied on the "ancient 
443. Id. at 19. 
444. "[H]e flashed on the sodomy statute ...• " Harris, supra note 409, at 2G, col. 5. 
445. Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association at 10. 
446. Id. at 11. 
447. Id. at 13-15. 
448. Brief of the National Organization for Women as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respon-
dents at 22-27 & n.13 (arguing that homosexuals met standards for scrutiny applied to suspect 
classifications). 
449. Id. at 24-25 & n.11. 
450. Id. at 26. 
451. Brest, supra note 434, at 2, col. 5. 
1646 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:1574 
roots"452 of prohibitions against sodomy. "[T]o claim that a right to 
engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' " he declared, 
"is, at best, facetious."453 White equated permitting consenting adult 
homosexuals to engage in oral or anal sex in their homes with allowing 
adultery, incest, "and other sexual crimes" to be committed in the 
home.454 But the horror at adultery seems false, and rape, forcible 
oral copulation, or forcible sodomy - possible "other sexual crimes" 
- do not, by their definitions, involve consenting adults. Incest, tech-
nically a crime of blood relation, is horrible because it frequently in-
volves sexual abuse of children and adolescents who do not "consent." 
White's vision of sexual perfidy blinded him to the very real distinc-
tions and harms among these acts. Incest is not a "sexual" crime; 
neither is rape, even if they are primarily crimes of gender that involve 
sex organs. Rather, as Professor Tribe had pointed out, these are all 
crimes of violence, domination, and exploitation.455 Against a ra-
tional-basis challenge to the statute,· White dismissively wrote, "The 
law . . . is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws 
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the 
Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed."456 He en-
tirely ignored ninth amendment, equal protection, and eighth amend-
ment claims, despite the fact that Professor Tribe explicitly made 
reference to the ninth amendment in his oral argument,457 Justice 
Powell specifically considered the eighth amendment in his concur-
rence, 458 and equal protection was implicated by the singling out of 
homosexuals for prosecution under the Georgia statute and was ex-
plicitly raised in the NOW brief.459 
Chief Justice Burger dwelt even more obsessively on the "crime 
against nature,'' essentially quoting verbatim from the State of Geor-
gia's brief.460 Indeed, Burger appeared to agree with Blackstone that 
"sodomy" was "an offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape"461 - dem-
onstrating an apparent lack of empathy for gays and women simulta-
452. 106 S. Ct. at 2844. 
453. 106 S. Ct. at 2846 (emphasis added). 
454. 106 S. Ct. at 2846. 
455. Official Transcript, supra note 417, at 21-22. 
456. 106 S. Ct. at 2846. 
457. Official Transcript, supra note 417, at 35. 
458. 106 S. Ct. at 2847 (Powell, J., concurring). 
459. See notes 448-50 supra and accompanying text. 
460. Compare 106 S. Ct. at 2847 (Burger, C.J., concurring) with Brief for Petitioner at 20-23 
(arguing Judeo-Christian tradition and law has condemned sodomy for centuries). 
461. 106 s. Ct. at 2847 (quoting 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *216). 
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neously, a real tour de force. While it is true that "taunting a 
conservative Reagan court with a homosexual case in a Falwellian era 
of Rambo, Eastwood and AIDS" may have meant a foregone conclu-
sion, 462 one cannot help but wonder if at least one of the Justices who 
joined the majority might have been open to another narrative had it 
been more available.463 
The dissenters saw the human issues. Justice Blackmun's opinion 
was singularly undisturbed by the subject of sex or homosexuality: 
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through 
their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as 
diverse as ours, that there may be many "right" ways of conducting 
those relationships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will 
come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature 
of these intensely personal bonds.464 
Blackmun observed: "The Court claims that its decision today merely 
refuses to recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sod-
omy; what the Court really has refused to recognize is the fundamen-
tal interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their 
intimate associations with others."465 
Blackmun agreed with Justice Holmes that 
"[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it 
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the 
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the 
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past."466 
In rebuttal to the claim that "the majority" abhorred the conduct, 
Blackmun stated, "[i]t is precisely because the issue raised by this case 
touches the heart of what makes individuals what they are that we 
should be especially sensitive to the rights of those whose choices upset 
the majority."467 "A State can no more punish private behavior be-
cause of religious intolerance than it can punish such behavior because 
of racial animus."468 There was no interference with the rights of 
others, "for the mere knowledge that other individuals do not adhere 
to one's value system cannot be a legally cognizable interest . . . let 
alone an interest that can justify invading the houses, hearts, and 
462. Harris, supra note 409, at IG, col. 1. 
463. Justice Powell might have stayed with his original intention to strike the statute, for 
example. Taylor, supra note 297, at 18, col. 4. 
464. 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
465. 106 S. Ct. at 2852. 
466. 106 S. Ct. at 2848 (quoting Holmes, The Path of the Law, IO HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 
(1897)). 
467. 106 S. Ct. at 2854 (emphasis added). 
468. 106 S. Ct. at 2855. 
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minds of citizens who choose to live their lives differently."469 Black-
mun concluded: 
I can only hope ... the Court soon will reconsider its analysis and con-
clude that depriving individuals of the right to choose for themselves 
how to conduct their intimate relationships poses a far greater threat to 
the values most deeply rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance of 
nonconformity could ever do.470 
Justice Stevens' dissent groped for an equal protection theme, and 
pointed to the irrationality of Georgia's claim that the statute was 
designed solely to punish homosexuals. The prohibition in the prede-
cessor to the current Georgia statute "was not purely hortatory."471 
Indeed, Stevens noted, the statute had at one point been construed to 
permit lesbians to engage in oral or anal sex while forbidding these 
acts for heterosexuals.472 The opinion then argued that the Court's 
cases had established the unconstitutionality of prohibiting private, 
consensual sexual activity between married couples as violating the 
right to privacy and the due process clause's protection of individual 
liberty.473 This was, indeed, a point conceded by counsel for Georgia 
at oral argument.474 The second section of Stevens' opinion examined 
whether homosexuals could be singled out for prosecution in light of 
Georgia's concession. Either Georgia must say that homosexuals do 
not have the same "liberty" interest "that others have," which is 
"plainly unacceptable," or there must be a "neutral and legitimate in-
terest" in differential treatment, "something more substantial than a 
habitual dislike for, or ignorance about, the disfavored group."475 
Georgia, "at this early stage of the litigation," had failed to meet its 
burden of justification, and "[a]t the very least . . . respondent has 
alleged a constitutional claim sufficient to withstand a motion to 
dismiss. "476 
There simply was no reason for Justice White's venomous attack 
or for Burger's thundering about the Judeo-Christian tradition other 
than prejudice and lack of empathic understanding. Even legality 
went by the wayside as a result: it would have been perfectly plausible 
within the realm of legality to write an opinion upholding the statute. 
469. 106 S. Ct. at 2856 (citation omitted). 
470. 106 S. Ct. at 2856. 
471. 106 S. Ct. at 2857 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Comer v. State, 21 Ga. App. 306, 
94 S.E. 314 (1917) (affirming prosecution for consensual heterosexual sodomy)). 
472. 106 S. Ct. at 2857 (citing Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S.E. 799 (1939)). 
473. 106 S. Ct. at 2857-58. 
474. Official Transcript, supra note 417, at 7-8. 
475. 106 S. Ct. at 2858-59 (emphasis added). 
476. 106 S. Ct. at 2859. 
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(Justice Powell recently suggested such an approach, indicating that 
his fear of abusing substantive due process analysis strongly influenced 
his vote in Hardwick 477) Perhaps it was less disingenuous that these 
Justices did not mask their dislike of an outgroup through a rhetoric of 
"balancing" or "legal principles" that would have more effectively dis-
guised empathic failure. Their revulsion certainly is not open to the 
accusation of being "liberal," namby-pamby, toothless, pluralistic tol-
erance such as that advocated by Blackmun's dissent. To assert that 
Blackmon was unprincipled, however, is to miss the point of his dis-
sent entirely. Blackmun was speaking for humans and for the positive 
values of a liberal state - respect for human freedom from oppression 
and tyranny. 
E. Summary 
The purpose of the foregoing discussion has been to demonstrate 
that empathic narrative is a part of legal discourse, and that empathic 
understanding can play a role in legal decisionmaking. The discussion 
is admittedly ahistorical, confined as it is to the particular narratives 
rather than any broader cultural or historical influence that affected 
the Court's decisions in these cases. Because of the ahistorical ap-
proach, among other things, the cases may seem too easily to be char-
acterized as "obvious" examples of good guys having empathy on their 
side and bad guys not. But Brown, Shapiro, and Roe, at least, did raise 
issues of empathy on both sides, the strongest example being Roe. 478 
The foregoing discussion might also be characterized as wildly opti-
mistic or ambitious about the prospects of empathic knowledge: as 
"everyone" knows, Brown II canceled Brown I, Dandridge419 and 
Kras 480 canceled Shapiro, and Roe will disappear now that Justice 
Powell has resigned.481 And, as everyone "knows," distrust of others 
and xenophobia are an inevitable part of human nature; the argument 
that empathy had anything to do with the outcome of Brown or Sha-
piro, for example, may seem to be merely the wishful thinking of a 
477. Taylor, supra note 297, at 18, col. 4. 
478. I hope to develop this issue more fully in a subsequent piece; the conclusion provides 
some preliminary thoughts on this topic. See text at note 490 infra. 
479. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
480. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973). 
481. Before this article went to press, President Reagan had nominated Judge Robert Bork, a 
declared opponent of Roe v. Wade, to replace Justice Powell. See Taylor, The Battle over Bork, 
N.Y. Times, July 5, 1987, at El, col. 3. And despite a clear Senate majority's opposition to the 
apparent vision of the Constitution held by Bork - and Reagan - Senate Minority Leader Dole 
has vowed that the next nominee will be "someone who believes in the same things that Judge 
Bork believes in, and ... that person will be confirmed." Shenon, Leaders Predict Early Bork 
Vote on Senate Floor, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1987, at 1, col. 5, 14, col. 6. 
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frustrated "liberal" academic, longing for a "liberal" Court. Another 
possible objection to my interpretation is that empathy is an unstable 
phenomenon, with no "staying power" or transformative potential; ar-
guably, it is quickly overwhelmed by dominant, unreflective ideologies 
and beliefs. Dominant modes of discourse won't be shaken; they are 
too resilient. Besides, people just don't want to hear these narratives 
- at least not for very long. Understanding the Other takes too much 
work and is too disturbing to keep up. 
Yet these criticisms would overlook the fact that the result in 
Brown came from an understanding that segregation, no matter how it 
was rationalized, caused human beings pain; the change in doctrine 
facilitated empathic understanding of blacks, by forcing whites to ac-
knowledge their humanity. Racism persists, but many whites by vir-
tue of becoming accustomed to being with blacks rather than 
separated have recognized our common humanity; while "contact ... 
cannot always overcome the personal variable in prejudice," people 
"with a normal degree of prejudice" will become less prejudiced as a 
result of "equal status contact between majority and minority groups 
in the pursuit of common goals."482 Unfortunately, empathy for the 
poor has not continued, perhaps because "the poor" can trigger so 
many prejudices - racial, ethnic, and sexual. Empathy for the poor 
also conflicts with the work ethic of capitalism and the belief that pov-
erty is never inescapable. Empathic understanding of the experience 
of women seems to wax and wane; with an administration bent on 
appointing Justices with a definite opposition to abortion, the issue of 
openness to empathic narrative in that area may in the immediate fu-
ture be moot. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The tentative conclusions that can be drawn about legality and em-
pathy are that empathic understanding is possible and that empathic 
narrative can and should be a proper and influential part of legal dis-
course. Empathic narrative need not .be fulsome rhetoric - the argu-
ment of Archibald Cox in Shapiro was simply phrased and the stories 
were told in a matter-of-fact tone. Appeals to emotion are not neces-
sarily appeals for empathy: The emotional argument of the state in 
Bowers v. Hardwick opposed empathy. But to be effective, empathic 
narrative does seem to require concrete human stories rather than sim-
ple abstract appeals to legal principles. And the presence or absence 
482. G. ALLPORT, supra note 99, at 280-81. 
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of empathic understanding does help us to understand why the four 
cases studied were decided the way they were. 
To the extent that "horror stories" dominate our emotional grasp 
of an experience, might the resulting decision be skewed if we were to 
encourage empathic knowledge? I have argued elsewhere that the 
parade of horrible stories of criminal victimization has led to some 
destructive laws.483 Is this not inevitable? Horror stories, however, do 
not constitute all of empathic understanding. Because they work at 
the level of affect in the hearer, they evoke emotional response. Yet 
frequently that emotional response is not empathic, because it is not the 
perception of the emotion or experience of another, but rather one's own 
response. One's own emotional response is certainly something to ex-
plore or consider, but it is not empathy. 
How to determine if the component of emotional response in em-
pathy is one's own or a resonation with the Other is not quickly an-
swered. The psychological phenomenon of projection - attributing 
one's own mental or emotional state to another - complicates things 
further.484 This is, of course, part of the larger problem of empathic 
accuracy - the ability not only to empathize, but to understand cor-
rectly what another is experiencing. It may not be possible to em-
pathize totally with another from a completely different culture, for 
example, and it is not always possible to interpret correctly the em-
pathic messages received. As Kennedy notes, you may be wrong.485 
But these concerns neither disprove the existence of empathy nor ex-
cuse a decisionmaker from considering empathic narratives. Instead, 
as with attaining other forms of knowledge and understanding, these 
concerns indicate that empathic understanding takes practice and 
work. Part of that practice can be accomplished in the form of ques-
tioning whether the received message is the correct one or asking for 
clarification. Part of it can be accomplished through attentiveness to 
empathic narrative. 
In The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 486 I attempted to demonstrate 
that the so-called "Victims' Rights Movement" largely ignored the 
phenomenological dimension of a crime victim's experience and that, 
accordingly, laws passed ostensibly in the crime victim's name may 
have worsened conditions for victims. Undoubtedly, the victims' rights 
movement evoked an empathic response in at least some voters and 
legislators, and that response led to action to remedy perceived injus-
483. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1985). 
484. D. WESTEN, supra note 30, at 94. 
485. Kennedy, supra note 20, at 639. 
486. Henderson, supra note 483. 
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tices. Yet the genuine empathic response seemed quickly to be subli-
mated into existing ideological debates about the criminal process. 
Certainly, I have argued, many of the laws passed in the name of "vic-
tims" often seemed to be anything but altruistic or caring toward those 
victims. The stories of victims were expropriated; few, if any, em-
pathic narratives were developed in the public discourse about victims' 
rights laws. Instead, "advocates" paraded horror stories before legis-
lators and the public; the need for counseling, support services, and 
understanding of the experience of victims of violent crime as perhaps 
the most appropriate response to the distress of crime victims was lost 
in the shuffie. Another possible explanation for the divergence of em-
pathic response and actual outcome was that the empathic response to 
crime victims was inaccurate or incomplete. For example, the unre-
flective translation of the anger of victims into a desire for retaliatory 
retribution might have been inaccurate.487 Furthermore, the initial 
empathic response to the stories of victims may have been so distres-
sing that the listener avoided empathizing further, and instead with-
drew from victims, recharacterized the story, or stopped listening -
all characteristic reactions to empathic distress. Finally, the existing 
structures of legality in the criminal process may have provided refuge 
from empathic response, so that those structures and debates about 
them replaced the very real debate over the pain a crime victim exper-
iences and how the legal system might address that pain. 
In other instances, empathy for victims may have so dominated 
thinking that empathy for other actors in the criminal justice "system" 
was obliterated. As Professor Lawrence Becker has accurately noted, 
"incompleteness in the range of empathic powers can produce moral 
error."488 This is not, however, an argument that eliminates the use-
fulness of empathy as a morally relevant mode of understanding, as 
Becker appears to assume. Absence of empathy produces moral error 
as well. It is simply a caution that selective empathy or unreflective 
empathy can mask moral choice. This is especially likely in the case of 
something like affirmative action, where a white decisionmaker un-
refiectively empathizes with whites to the exclusion of minorities and 
reaches a decision "in favor" of whites. 489 As a result, patterns of 
covert discrimination are legitimated and become more entrenched; 
this, I would argue, constitutes "moral error." 
Becker and others also imply that empathizing with morally "rele-
487. Id. at 996-99. 
488. L. BECKER, RECIPROCITY 159 (1986). 
489. Cf Lawrence, supra note 63. 
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vant 'types' of people" can be "disabling."490 Does empathy with all 
concerned create decisional paralysis? The affirmative action problem 
and the problem of abortion, for example, seem to present insoluble 
dilemmas if one empathizes with both - or all - affected. If legality 
- in the form of categories, accepted analogies, rules, habits - pro-
vides a solution to the dilemma by negating one side or another of the 
moral choice, it will perhaps overcome the moral paralysis we assume 
would follow. But ducking of moral choice via refuge in legality is 
irresponsible. Moreover, the view that decisional paralysis necessarily 
will follow is based on a kind of Manichaeism - the belief that there 
is one, and only one, "right" answer. Empathy may enable the deci-
sionmaker to see other "right" answers, or a continuum of answers. 
Or it may simply make the decisionmaker aware that what once 
seemed like no choice or a clear choice is instead a tragic one. To 
mask the tragedy of choice by taking refuge in rules does not negate 
the tragedy. 
Empathy cannot necessarily tell us what to do or how to accom-
plish something, but it does alert us to moral choice and responsibility. 
It also reminds us of our common humanity and responsibility to one 
another. We could do worse - indeed we have done worse - than to 
employ the knowledge empathy imparts to us. 
490. L. BECKER, supra note 488, at 159. 
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